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THE NEW LACHES:
CREATING TITLE WHERE NONE EXISTED
Kathryn E. Fort*
"Laches can scarcely create title where none existed."'
"A thousand years in the sight of the Chancellor are but as yesterday." 2
"[In] a suit brought by the United States in its sovereign capacity. .., it is
clear state limitations period[s] do not apply."3
INTRODUCTION
Recent legal decisions dealing with Indian land claims have been cre-
ating title for private property owners where no title previously existed. As
has been explored by others, various areas of property law have been turned
upside down in order to defeat tribes in court.4 However, one area, equity,
has received special attention from the courts.' Specifically, the equitable
defenses of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility were used by the United
States Supreme Court in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation6 to hand
defeat to the Oneida Indian Nation on a tax issue.7 Since then, lower courts
in the Second Circuit have used this precedent to deny Indian land claims
altogether.' But is the use of these three defenses based on precedent them-
selves? A careful examination of City of Sherrill and its progeny reveals
that these defenses have in fact been combined to create a new defense,
* Staff Attorney, Michigan State University Indigenous Law and Policy Center; Adjunct Profes-
sor, Michigan State University College of Law; B.A., Hollins College, 1999; J.D., Michigan State
University College of Law, 2005. I would like to thank Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singel,
Carrie Garrow, Bryan Newland, Joy Grow, Michelle Bostic, and Jane Edwards, Barbara Bean, and the
rest of the MSU College of Law library staff. I would like to especially thank Ross and David Fort, and
Diane, Ken, and Anne Henningfeld.
1 Ziegler v. Simmons, 91 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Mich. 1958).
2 George Wharton Pepper, The Effect of Lapse of Time on Suits in Equity, 41 AM. L. REG. & REV.
319, 331 (1893).
3 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 378 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939)).
4 See Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38
CONN. L. REV. 605, 610 (2006).
5 See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Ewart v. Bluejacket,
259 U.S. 129 (1922); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), Swim v. Bergland,
696 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1983).
6 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
7 ld.at202-03,217-21.
8 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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what I will call the "new laches" defense. This new defense, so far used
successfully in Indian land cases in New York State9 but unsuccessfully
elsewhere,' l has been so broadly construed by the Second Circuit that it
could apply to any treaty-based claim brought by Indians or Indian tribes."
If this interpretation were adopted nationwide, it could be used by federal,
state, and local authorities to quash any Indian land claim.
Laches is rarely used outside of some narrow areas of common law 2
and has been all but barred from federal Indian law cases. 3 The Supreme
Court's decision in City of Sherrill, however, injected this new equitable
9 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
10 Paiute-Shoshone Indians v. City of Los Angeles, No. 1:06-cv-00736 OWW LJO, 2007 WL
521403, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007) ("Here, however, because the issue of laches raises significant
questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss, it is most efficient to deny they [sic]
City's motion to dismiss on the ground of laches, without prejudice to its renewal."). The court goes on
to discuss and cite to City ofSherrill. Id. at *9-11.
11 Mem. of Law in Supp. of the State of N.Y. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 17, Onondaga Nation v.
New York, No. 05-CV-00314 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) ("Aboriginal land claims that have a disruptive
effect on the governance of state and local jurisdictions and upon the long-settled, justifiable expecta-
tions of current landowners are subject to dismissal, on a motion to dismiss, based upon well-recognized
equitable principles."). The state does not limit its conclusion to land claims based on the Non-
Intercourse Act, which it could, given it is fighting a claim based on violation of the Non-Intercourse
Act. Id. at 2, 17. Instead it chose to follow the broader view of Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413
F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), that Sherrill's holding applies to any aboriginal land claim that may be consid-
ered disruptive. Id at 20.
12 See, e.g., Boone v. Mech. Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VII claim);
Oliver v. State, 843 N.E.2d 581, 586-88, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (post-conviction petition).
13 Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939) ("[S]tate notions of laches and state
statutes of limitations have no applicability to suits by the Government, whether on behalf of Indians or
otherwise." (citing United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926))); Ewart v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S.
129, 138 (1922) ("[T]he equitable doctrine of laches ... cannot properly have application to give vitality
to a void deed and to bar the rights of Indian wards in lands subject to statutory restrictions." (citing
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 500 (1913); Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 417
(1894); Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 372 (1892))); Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 718 (9th Cir.
1983) ("Laches or estoppel is not available to defeat Indian treaty rights. This is true even where the
Indians have long acquiesced in use by others of affected lands or have purported to grant away their
occupancy and use rights without federal authorization." (citations omitted)); United States v. 7,405.3
Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 423 (4th Cir. 1938) ("It is beyond the power of the state, either through
statutes of limitation or adverse possession, to affect the interest of the United States; and the United
States manifestly has an interest in preserving the property of these wards of the government for their
use and benefit."); Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, 278 F. Supp. 2d 313,
330-33 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (chastising the state defendants for continuing to argue laches against the
tribe's claims because "[lI]aches has no place in Indian land claim actions"); Schaghticoke Tribe of
Indians v. Kent Sch. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (D. Conn. 1976) ("The cases make plain that
limitations, adverse possession, laches and estoppel cannot bar recovery of Indian lands in a suit brought
to recover protected territory.... [T]he inapplicability of these affirmative defenses extends to suits by
individual Indians and is not solely a product of the sovereign immunity of the United States. The de-
termination is rooted in the language and purpose of federal protective statutes like the Nonintercourse
[sic] Act." (footnote omitted)).
[VOL. 16:2
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defense into the area of federal Indian law, allowing state and local gov-
ernment defendants to eliminate land claims before they begin. 4 Further-
more, the broad reading of the new laches defense by the Second Circuit
enables states and others opposing tribal claims to use this argument against
any tribal treaty claim based on so-called "ancient" 5 transactions and trea-
ties. 6
In addition to laches, the City of Sherrill Court analyzed two other eq-
uitable defenses, acquiescence and impossibility, 7 but lower courts have
focused almost exclusively on laches.'5 However, it would be more accu-
rate to identify this version of laches as a new defense, distinguishable from
the traditional laches defense. This "new laches" was created from a com-
bination and misunderstanding of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility
and seems to be applicable only against Indian claims.' 9 Rather than being
based primarily upon the length of time from the original wrong to its arri-
val in federal court, the new laches defense is based upon the disruption a
successful claim may cause to the "settled expectations" of state and local
government defendants.2 ° It is not clear what character of disruption is nec-
14 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 216-17 (2005); see, e.g., Oneida Indian
Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134-37, 146-47 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (partially dismissed under
FED. R. Civ. P. 56, Summary Judgment); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Town of Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. 278,
281-82 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissed under FED. R. CIv. P. 12(c), Motion for Judgment on the Plead-
ings); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL 3501099, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Failure to State a Claim). But see
Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 2007 WL 521403, at * 11 ("Here, however, because the issue of laches raises
significant questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss, it is most efficient to deny
they [sic] City's motion to dismiss on the ground of laches, without prejudice to its renewal.").
15 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202 ("In the instant action, OIN resists the payment of property
taxes to Sherrill on the ground that OIN's acquisition of fee title to discrete parcels of historic reserva-
tion land revived the Oneidas' ancient sovereignty piecemeal over each parcel .... Our 1985 decision
recognized that the Oneidas could maintain a federal common-law claim for damages for ancient
wrongdoing in which both national and state governments were complicit." (emphasis added)).
16 See discussion infra Part III.C.
17 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217-21.
18 Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Inasmuch as the instant
claim, a possessory land claim, is subject to the doctrine of laches, we conclude that the present case
must be dismissed because the same considerations that doomed the Oneidas' claim in City of Sherrill
apply with equal force here .... We thus hold that the doctrine of laches bars the possessory land claim
presented by the Cayugas here." (footnote omitted)); Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 133
("[T]he Court now holds that Defendants can assert a laches defense against Plaintiffs' possessory land
claims."); Shinnecock, 2006 WL 3501099, at *6 ("[W]e find that plaintiffs' possessory land claim is
subject to laches, and dismiss on that basis."); New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d
486, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("There are.., differences in the City of Sherrill case and the case at bar, not
the least of which may be the question of the extent of the impact of the 'disruptive' claims, the nature
of the Indians' present titles and possibly the length of delay and the question of laches, and appropriate
remedies." (footnote omitted)).
19 See discussion infra Parts III.B-C.
20 See discussion infra Part III.C.I.
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essary to justify the invocation of the new laches defense. While elements
of impossibility and acquiescence form part of this new defense, the easiest
way to demonstrate the difference of this defense is to compare it to tradi-
tional laches.21 Only by tracing the original defenses can one see the major
shifts from standard laches to new laches. New laches barely resembles the
traditional defense of laches that has been used with relative consistency
since the fourteenth century.22
The first Part of this Article reviews the Supreme Court's application
of laches and equity to the Oneida Indian Nation's claim to immunity from
state and local taxation, as well as the aftermath of that decision in the Sec-
ond Circuit. The second Part traces the history of laches, from its first use in
England through its adoption by the United States. The third Part discusses
the differences between traditional laches and new laches and analyzes the
significant pragmatic problems the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
have created in applying the new laches defense to Indian tribes and the
United States.
I. CITY OF SHERRILL AND BEYOND
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, the United States Supreme
Court introduced the equitable defenses of laches, acquiescence, and im-
possibility into an area where courts had almost always barred them from
being used as defenses. 23 Based on lower court interpretations of City of
Sherrill,24 it might also appear to a casual reader that City of Sherrill was a
land claims case, when, in fact, the claim involved a tax dispute. 25 The city
attempted to tax land within the historic boundaries of the Oneida reserva-
tion purchased by the Oneida Nation ("the Nation") through open-market
transactions.2 6 The Nation sought immunity from the taxes, seeking to exer-
cise its own sovereignty over its own lands. 7 The Supreme Court chose not
to follow its long line of cases focusing on tribal tax immunities, which are
21 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217-21; see also infra Part II.
22 See infra Part III.C.
23 Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939) (citing United States v. Minnesota,
270 U.S. 181 (1926)).
24 E.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 275 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Under the City of
Sherrill formulation, this type of possessory land claim-seeking possession of a large swath of central
New York State and the ejectment of tens of thousands of landowners-is indisputably disruptive.").
25 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202 ("In the instant action, OIN resists the payment of property
taxes to Sherrill on the ground that OIN's acquisition of fee title to discrete parcels of historic reserva-
tion land revived the Oneidas' ancient sovereignty piecemeal over each parcel.").
26 Id. at 211-12.
27 id.
[VOL. 16:2
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abundant.28 Rather, the Court focused on the disruptive nature that the exer-
cise of the Nation's sovereignty would have on the "governance of New
York's counties and towns. ' 29 The Court applied three defenses to the Na-
tion's claims: laches, acquiescence, and impossibility." The serious doc-
trinal problems with this case have been well documented by others, 3' and a
recent case demonstrates these important commentaries have not gone un-
noticed. 32
The case with the potential to be the most harmful to tribal interests
was decided later that same year. In 2005, the Second Circuit in Cayuga
Indian Nation v. Pataki33 took City of Sherrill out of the area of taxation
and into the area of general Indian land claims.34 The Second Circuit "con-
clude[d] that the possessory land claim alleged [in Cayuga Indian Nation]
is the type of claim to which a laches defense can be applied," and "based"
that conclusion on City of Sherrill.5 The case began a trend in the circuit to
combine all three defenses separately identified in City of Sherrill into one
defense called "laches," sometimes expressed as "disruption."'" The Ca-
yuga Nation was initially seeking possession of the land purchased by the
state in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act, a purchase never ratified by
the federal government.37 In addition, the Cayuga Nation sought monetary
compensation in the form of trespass damages and proceeds connected with
natural resources.38 However, after nineteen years, the district court deter-
mined that ejectment would not be a proper remedy and that "monetary
damages will produce results which are as satisfactory to the Cayugas as
those which they could properly derive from ejectment."39 After a long pro-
28 E.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac
& Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991); Cotton Petro. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
29 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202.
30 Id. at217-21.
31 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 4, at 608-12; Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York: A Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen's Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 5, 7-11 (2005).
32 Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing
Singer, supra note 4).
33 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
34 This was easy to do given City of Sherrill's focus on the Oneida Indian Nation's land claims.
City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 203-17.
35 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 268.
36 See infra note 52.
37 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 269.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 271 (citing Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, No. 80-CV-930, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10579, at *79, *97 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1999)).
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cedural history, the district court awarded the Nation $247,911,999.42, and
both parties appealed to the Second Circuit.4"
The Second Circuit held that the monetary damages were based on a
claim that "is and has always been sounding in ejectment," and that eject-
ment is "indisputably disruptive."' 41 Because of this disruption, the Nation
would be subject to the "equitable considerations" described in City of
Sherrill,12 even though ejectment is a legal, not equitable, claim. 3 This case
is where the defenses of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility start to
merge into a new legal argument-the new laches defense. The Second
Circuit does this by giving short shrift to the defenses of acquiescence and
impossibility and by creating new prongs for laches, rather than following
the traditional definition.44 Traditional laches has two prongs, delay and
injury. 45 The court focuses on the potential disruption of the tribal claim
instead of injury to the parties. 6 In fact, the Second Circuit has taken the
Supreme Court's "impossibility" doctrine, normally a contract defense, and
labeled it "laches."47 The "impossibility" defense-its history is described
infra at Part Ill-stands for the proposition that any exercise of tribal sover-
eignty over newly reacquired tribal land is "impossible" because of the
"disruption" it would cause. 48 Given that the level of "disruption" in City of
40 Id. at 273.
41 Id. at 274-75.
42 Id. at 275.
43 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION §§ 1.2 n.2, 5.10(1) (abr.
2d ed. 1993).
44 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 273-77.
45 DOBBS, supra note 43, § 2.4(4), at 75 ("In its most orthodox form, laches is unreasonable delay
by the plaintiff in prosecuting a claim ... and under circumstances causing prejudice to the defen-
dant."); see, e.g., Ottawa Tribe of Okla. v. Speck, 447 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (N.D. Ohio 2006) ("Laches
is an equitable remedy that applies when a plaintiff has 1) unreasonably delayed in asserting his or her
rights, and 2) causes prejudice to the defendant as a result of this delay." (citing Coalition for Gov't
Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., 365 F.3d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 2004))).
46 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275, 277.
47 Id. at 275 ("[T]his type of possessory land claim ... is indisputably disruptive. Indeed, this
disruptiveness is inherent in the claim itself ... rather than an element of any particular remedy ....
Accordingly, we conclude that possessory land claims of this type are subject to the equitable considera-
tions of Sherrill."). See Kathryn E. Fort, The (In)Equities of Federal Indian Law, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr.
2007, at 32, 37-38, for a discussion of the "impossibility doctrine" that was created by the Supreme
Court in City of Sherrill and appears to appeal directly to a judge's need to have a solution the judge
does not consider "impossible." Therefore, anything a judge considers "disruptive" is an "impossible"
solution. Rather than continuing to make these distinctions, the Cayuga court and others put this all
together into a discussion of laches. See Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 273-77.
48 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 219 (2005).
Finally, this Court has recognized the impracticability of returning to Indian control land that
generations earlier passed into numerous private hands.... In this case, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the "impossibility" doctrine had no application because [the Oneida Indian
Nation] acquired the land in the open market and does not seek to uproot current property
owners. But the unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sovereign control,
[VOL. 16:2
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Sherrill was set at such a low bar, the Nation's exercise of sovereignty over
land it already owned,49 the impossibility defense could be used to block
any tribal claim. The new laches is the "impossibility" doctrine restated,
and the "impossibility" doctrine has the potential to block all tribal claims.
Stating that federal Indian law is "unusually complex and confusing,"
the Second Circuit held that the "doctrines and categorizations applicable in
other areas do not translate neatly" to Indian land claims.5" Ironically, the
court cites cases that uphold provisions protecting Indian lands due to the
tribe's status as a sovereign.5" Unfortunately, the complexity and confusion
surrounding the Indian land claims only increased with the court's ruling in
this case.
After Cayuga, courts used City of Sherrill and Cayuga to dismiss vari-
ous claims at the pleadings stage, all using a combination of delay and dis-
ruption, sometimes characterized as laches or a combination of disruption
and impossibility, to deny tribal claims.52 What is common, regardless of
terminology, is the so-termed "disruptive" nature of the tribal claims.53 De-
lay in bringing the claim seems primarily to be a problem as an element of
disruption. 4 In addition, while these are all claims based in New York, the
use of laches by cities and states to defend against any kind of tribal claim
has not gone unnoticed. For instance, in Paiute-Shoshone Indians v. City of
Los Angeles,55 the Eastern District of California discussed equitable de-
fenses at length with regard to a land claim only sixty-five years old that
also implicated water rights. 56 While the tribe avoided summary judgment,
the court's discussion of the defenses is not necessarily a win for tribes be-
even over land purchased at the market price, would have disruptive practical
consequences ......
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 202.
50 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 276.
51 See, e.g., Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that
courts have rejected adverse possession defenses against Indian land claims).
52 See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887, 2006 WL 3501099, at *3-6
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (claims dismissed based on laches); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Town of Aure-
lius, 233 F.R.D. 278, 281-82 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (judgment on the pleadings granted based on impossibil-
ity); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Vill. of Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (2005) (summary judg-
ment granted in light of the City of Sherrill decision based on "disruption").
53 See, e.g., Shinnecock Indian Nation, 2006 WL 3501099, at *5 ("[T]he test for disruptiveness is
not based on strict numeric calculations .... The Court finds disruptive Shinnecocks' claim that seeks
the immediate ejectment of a number of defendants ...."); Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206
(noting the "disruptive effects of immunity from state and local zoning laws").
54 E.g., Shinnecock Indian Notion, 2006 WL 3501099, at *5 (accepting a laches defense despite
the Nation's claim that "it has not slept on its rights" because it "objected to the 1859 taking in the very
year it occurred" and finding the passage of 140 years and significant changes in the property critical in
holding that ejectment would have "disruptive consequences of the type that led the Supreme Court to
initiate the impossibility doctrine").
" No. 1-06-CV-00736, 2007 WL 521403 (ED. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007).
56 Id. at*8-11.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363 2008-2009
GEO. MASON L. REv.
cause the court, while recognizing that ejectment is "technically" a legal
claim, agreed with Cayuga and allowed equitable defenses to be raised. 7
Also disappointing is the court's reliance on Felix v.. Patrick,5" a case
known for its racist undertones. 9
In Ottawa Tribe v. Speck,6 the Northern District of Ohio also dis-
cussed the current state of laches under City of Sherrill and Cayuga.6 The
court did not dismiss on laches, but left the door open for the parties to con-
tinue to use the defense.62 In the district court's final decision, the court
found that the tribe's "delay in asserting its treaty rights governing hunting
and fishing in Ohio was unreasonable, and [the tribe's] justifications for the
delay are not well-taken."63 Based on laches, the court found against the
tribe on their claims to treaty hunting and inland fishing rights.'
These cases demonstrate a willingness by the courts to expand laches
in an attempt to dismiss tribal land claims. This body of law has now cre-
ated the defense of new laches, which is not based on the original definition
of laches. By tracing the defense from its earliest origins, tribes and courts
can see the fundamental changes in the law since City of Sherrill.
II. TRADITIONAL LACHES FROM THE ENGLISH COURT OF EQUITY
A lengthy historical study of laches has not been done for almost two
decades.65 Given the current blend of law and equity, laches is perceived as
an anachronism, especially with the prevalence of statutes of limitations.66
However, only by comparing the laches used in Indian land cases with the
traditional understanding of laches can the practitioner see the stark differ-
17 Id. at*-9-11.
58 145 U.S. 317 (1892). For a discussion of why this reference is particularly troubling, see, for
example, Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41
TULSA L. REV. 21, 45-47 (2005).
59 See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 58, at 39-41.
60 447 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
61 Id. at 844-45.
62 Id. ("A court may look at the disruptive effect a plaintiff's relief would have on other
parties.... [T]he state of the current record is inconclusive and the Court cannot dismiss at this junc-
ture." (citation omitted)).
63 Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 541 F. Supp. 2d 971, 977 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
64 Id. at 986. The court, however, did not dismiss the tribe's claims to fishing in Lake Erie, hold-
ing there was a "dispute of material facts surrounding the prejudice to [the state] of asserting treaty
rights to fish in Lake Erie ..... Id. This "prejudice" is defined as "disruption" by the court, one of the
prongs of new laches. Id at 978.
65 See generally Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the
Doctrine of Laches, 1992 BYU L. REv. 917.
66 Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1179 (1950) ("In the
United States today, for the great majority of actions the time for bringing suit is governed by general
statutes of limitations found in every state.").
[VOL. 16:2
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ences between the two.67 In Costello v. United States,6" the Supreme Court
defined laches as a defense that "requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by
the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the par-
ty asserting the defense."69 This definition has been frequently cited.70
However, there is no mention of it in City of Sherrill and, instead, the City
of Sherrill Court cited far older cases.7" By citing such old cases, the Court
reinforced the age of the Oneida Nation's claim and its perceived obscurity.
The cases the Court cited lead back to even older cases, to cases from Eng-
land and to a specific definition of laches.7" After these citations, however,
the Court went on to apply a new defense, one based on laches, but at the
same time not laches.
73
Generally speaking, laches is a defense in equity that stands for the
proposition that a court will not find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff delayed
in bringing the case, and that delay harmed the defendant. 74 According to
Professor George Pepper, laches only applies "if during the delay of the
plaintiff there has been a loss of evidence, or by reason of the delay of the
plaintiff the defendant or third persons have altered their position for the
worse."75 Accordingly, laches has traditionally had two, or at most three,
components--delay, a position change for the worse, and a loss of evi-
dence.76
Laches originally developed in English courts of equity. These courts
of equity began as chancery courts.77 The chancellor, the highest counselor
and a direct representative of the king or queen, heard cases outside of the
67 The Supreme Court cited to particularly old cases in City of Sherrill. City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005) ("It is well established that laches, a doctrine focused on one
side's inaction and the other's legitimate reliance, may bar long-dormant claims for equitable relief."
(citing Badger v. Badger, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 87, 94 (1865); Wagner v. Baird, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 234, 258
(1849); Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. (I How.) 189, 194 (1843))).
68 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
69 Id. at 282 (citing Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951); S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert,
250 U.S. 483, 488-90 (1919); Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 372 (1892)). Costello was cited by the
Supreme Court as recently as 2002 in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
121-22 (2002).
70 See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 121-22; New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S.
767, 806 (1998); Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995).
71 See supra note 67.
72 See supra note 67.
73 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217-21 (2005); see also infra Part III.B.
74 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 891 (8th ed. 2004).
75 Pepper, supra note 2, at 32 1.
76 See Fort, supra note 47, at 34 (arguing that loss of evidence in Indian land cases is rarely a
problem because the federal government has meticulous records of treaties, land transactions, and other
evidence which can be, and have been, used in Indian land claims).
77 See Heriot, supra note 65, at 926-27 (noting that courts in numerous cases from the era of
Henry VIII and James I subscribed in one form or another to the substance of the doctrine of laches).
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 365 2008-2009
GEO. MASON L. REV.
jurisdiction of the court of common law.78 Because of the strictness of the
courts of common law regarding the forms of lawsuits, parties seeking jus-
tice outside of these forms appealed directly to the king via the chancellor,
who had broad jurisdiction.79 These courts were separate until the 1870s,
when England reorganized its courts and gave each the power to hear cases
in both law and equity.8" Prior to the reorganization, the courts of England
were much as they had been for centuries, and the court of the chancery
occupied the place where cases not available to be heard in the court of
common pleas could be decided.
Based on pleading justice to the king himself, the chancellor decided
all cases based on his conscience."' Because of this, for many years there
was no precedent; 2 each chancellor had a different conscience, giving rise
to the oft-cited quote: "[e]quity is a roguish thing. For law we have a meas-
ure ... equity is according to the conscience of him that is [c]hancellor, and
as that is larger or narrower, so is equity."83 Records indicate that the chan-
cellor began hearing disputes on behalf of the king during the reign of Ri-
chard II, from 1377 to 1399. 8' The rise of the equitable courts of the chan-
cery corresponds directly with a time of violence and unrest when no fewer
than four kings were murdered by their successors, from 1399 to 1485.85 As
one commentator noted:
78 JOHN MCGHEE, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 6-7 (30th ed., Sweet-& Maxwell Ltd. 2000)
(1868).
79 Id; 3 SAMUEL R. GARDINER, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I TO THE
OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR 1603-1642, at 10 (1965) ("A custom had gradually arisen of seeking
redress in Chancery, in cases where the Common Law courts had failed to do justice on account of the
strictness of the rules which they had laid down for their guidance.").
80 PHILIP S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 41 (10th ed. 1979) ("By these Acts the
superior courts were reorganized and were placed substantially upon their present-day footing.").
81 MCGHEE, supra note 78, at 7 ("In the Middle Ages the Chancellor's jurisdiction was undefined.
His powers were wide but vague, and coextensive only with the necessity that evoked them. He exer-
cised his powers on the ground of conscience.").
82 Fiona R. Bums, The Court of Chancery in the 19th Century: A Paradox of Decline and Expan-
sion, 21 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 198, 201 (2001).
83 Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429,
445 (2003).
84 Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 840
(1918); see also 3 JOHN REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW FROM THE TIME OF THE SAXONS TO
THE END OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP AND MARY 194 (2d ed. 1787) (citing a statute by Richard II establish-
ing the jurisdiction of the chancery, which "may be considered as a legislative sanction to its establish-
ment...").
85 Richard II was deposed in 1399 by Henry IV, Henry VI was deposed by Edward IV in 1461,
Edward V was deposed by Richard III in 1483, and Richard III was deposed by Henry VII in 1485.
CHRISTINE CARPENTER, THE WARS OF THE ROSES: POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN ENGLAND, C.
1437-1509, at 9, 116, 209, 217 (1997); Barbour, supra note 84, at 849 (noting the rise of petitions to the
Chancellor as "very common" by the time of Henry V).
[VOL. 16:2
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 366 2008-2009
2009] THE NEW LACHES: CREATING TITLE WHERE NONE EXISTED
It is in brief the complete breakdown of the system of criminal justice which occasioned the
Chancellor's action. Beyond question appears the imperative need in medieval England for a
great judge who had the prestige and power to suppress the outrages of offenders who were
strong enough to put at naught the ordinary processes of the law.... Certainly the petitions
[in equity] bear witness to the belief among all classes that in the Chancellor resided a gen-
eral power to redress all wrongs if for any reason the person injured could not protect himself
through the common law.
86
Why a period of regal weakness led to the rise of the chancellor's ju-
risdiction is not immediately apparent. Few commentators or current writers
mention this parallel.87 Perhaps the rule of law expressed through the com-
mon law courts had no efficacy to the citizens suffering from the wars be-
tween the king and his nobles. For whatever reason, however, by the end of
the period of disruption, the power of the chancellor to decide cases was
firmly established. 8 Cardinal Wolsey, who exercised tremendous power
under Henry VIII, used his chancery decisions to further the reach of equity
jurisprudence, creating four equity courts to hear additional petitions.89 In-
terestingly, this expansion was later used by Parliament against him during
his removal.9° During the reign of James I, a dispute broke out between the
proponents of law and equity.9 The king, understanding equity to be his
power, sided with those promoting equity,92 and the courts of both have
continued to this day in some jurisdictions, though they now have merged
in both England and the United States federal system. 9
Eventually, even though chancery began with equity jurisdiction that
changed with the chancellor, maxims developed, particularly as the chan-
cellor began farming out his work to lower courts. 94 The maxims provided
86 Barbour, supra note 84, at 857.
87 See J.A. Guy, The Development of Equitable Jurisdictions, 1450-1550, in LAW, LITIGANTS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 80, 81 (E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester eds., 1983) (discussing M.E. Avery's
contention that the rise of the chancellor was for protection of private rights during the Wars of the
Roses).
88 See id.
89 See EDWARD FOSS, BIOGRAPHIA JURIDICA: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE JUDGES OF
ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME, 1066-1870, at 752-54 (1870).
90 See id. at 756 ("[A]lthough [Wolsey] had a complete defense... in the royal license confirming
the authority under which he acted, he at once saw, in this revival of an obsolete statute ... a precon-
certed determination to effect his ruin.").
91 See GARDINER, supra note 79, at 1-6; Main, supra note 83, at 446 (discussing the relatively
famous dispute in London between Lord Coke and Lord Bacon).
92 Main, supra note 83, at 446 & n.109.
93 See id. at 474-76. But see generally Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. & Michael A. Pittenger, CORPORATE
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 2.02[a] (2008) (discussing
Delaware as one example of a jurisdiction that has chosen to keep a separate court of chancery for
historical and practical considerations).
94 See 4 REEVES, supra note 84, at 380; MCGHEE, supra note 78, at 8 ("What had begun as an
irregular process of petitioning the Crown in extraordinary circumstances had become a regular system
of courts with a recognised jurisdiction.").
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guidance for the judges and developed both the claims and defenses in eq-
uity.9" One of the defenses was laches, which was one way the court of
chancery determined the fairness of a claim.96 Long delays in bringing a
claim created a number of harms, including the loss of evidence, the posi-
tion of the defendant, and the perception of unstable law.97
The word laches itself stems from the French word, la lachesse, for
negligence or delay.98 Even before the rise of the courts of chancery, delay
in bringing a claim was something the courts looked to avoid. The doctrine
was used as early as 1311 in a property inheritance dispute. 99 A woman
brought a claim through her second husband regarding a land issue.' The
claim itself was old and, in its decision, the court discussed the issue of
laches. 0' The plaintiff had to wait until the death of her first husband to
bring the claim.'02 Though written in 13 11, the court's discussion of laches
is recognizable to modem legal scholars because its definition has changed
only slightly since then; the party bringing the claim is accused of a delay
that harmed the defendant.0 3 The court appeared ready to apply laches if
the petitioner had been a man; however, because the petitioner was a
woman, the court decided laches was not an appropriate remedy.'4 The fact
that the petitioner was a woman made the application of laches unfair be-
cause she had to wait until her husband's death to bring the claim. 0 The
court was not a court of equity, but still viewed laches as malleable, requir-
ing a balancing of fairness on both sides.' 6 This doctrine also gave the
95 See JOHN M. GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, IN CONTRAST WITH THE DOCTRINES OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW ON THE
SUBJECT OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 83 (photo. reprint 1972) (1819).
96 See Heriot, supra note 65, at 926-27 ("Power was vested in the equity judge to do what was
best.").
97 See Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890) ("The doctrine of laches is based upon
grounds of public policy, which requires for the peace of society the discouragement of stale demands;
and where the difficulty of doing entire justice by reason of the death of the principal witness or wit-
nesses, or from the original transactions having become obscured by time, is attributable to gross negli-
gence or deliberate delay .... "); see also Smith v. Clay, (1767) 3 Bro. C.C. 646, 29 Eng. Rep. 743, 745
(Ch.) ("And the public peace requiring an end of suits.").
98 Antoni Vaquer, Verwirkung Versus Laches: A Tole of Two Legal Transplants, 21 TUL. EUR. &
Civ. L.F. 53, 54-55 n.4 (2006).
99 See id. at 55 (citing Gascelyn v. Rivere, Y.B. 4 Edw. 2 (1311), reprinted in 42 SELDEN SOCIETY
50,54 (1926)).
100 Gascelyn, 42 SELDEN SOCIETY at 50.
101 See id. at 54.
102 id.
103 See id. at 53.
104 See id. at 54.
105 See id.
106 Gascelyn, 42 SELDEN SOCIETY at 53-54.
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court flexibility, as there was no set time for how long of a delay invoked
laches. '07
This flexibility in the doctrine was cited more than five hundred years
later by another English court. In Lindsay Petroleum v. Hurd,' Sir Barnes
Peacock held that "the doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbi-
trary or a technical doctrine."1"9 An even earlier English case held that
"[m]ere lapse of time does not bar in equity any more than at law: it is an
ingredient which, with other circumstances, may lead the [c]ourt to draw
inferences unfavourable to the claim of a party who has let twenty or nearly
twenty years elapse without asserting his right.' 1
As with other equitable defenses, certain maxims developed around
the use of laches. There was tension in the old English equity courts over
what John Kroger differentiates as traditional equity and modem equity."'
Traditional equity was enforcing "natural law," having no set rules or
precedent." 2 Modem equity, as defined by Blackstone, had rules and prece-
dent and was similar to the common law."I3 In regards to laches, those rules
included the definition of laches (delay and injury), the establishment of
laches as an equitable defense (rather than a legal one), the fact that laches
required a balancing of the particular equities of each case, the fact that
laches generally did not bar a suit if brought within the period set by the
applicable statute of limitations, the requirement that the defendant have
clean hands when arguing laches, and the fact that laches could not be ap-
plied to the sovereign." 4
III. EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Equity jurisprudence survived in the United States after the Revolu-
tionary War and was based entirely on English equity jurisprudence."'
While it is true that "there was no confusing the Supreme Court with a
Chancellor who wielded the Crown's delegated prerogative to 'do justice'
according to conscience and despite the law,""' 6 by 1787 each of the thir-
107 See id. at 54.
108 (1874) 5 L.R.-P.C. 221 (appeal taken from Ont.).
109 Id. at 239.
110 Penny v. Allen, (1857) 7 De G.M. & M. 409,426,44 Eng. Rep. 160, 166 (Ch.).
111 John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of American Judging, 34
Hous. L. REv. 1425, 1433-37 (1998).
112 Id. at 1433-35.
113 Id. at 1438.
114 See 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 419 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (1881); 21 C.J. § 216
(1920).
115 Main, supra note 83, at 449-50.
116 Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REv. 1207, 1256 (2001).
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teen colonies had given their courts the power to hear cases in equity. "7
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution gave the newly estab-
lished federal court jurisdiction to hear "all cases, in law and equity.""' 8
Justice Story, as a circuit justice in 1821, found that the equity jurisdiction
of the federal courts "does not depend on what is exercised by courts of
equity, or courts of law, in the several states; but depends upon what is a
proper subject of equitable relief in the courts of equity in England, the
great reservoir from which we have extracted our principles of jurispru-
dence.""' 9 In addition, Justice Story asserted that, in passing the 1877 judi-
ciary statute, "there could be no doubt that the legislature intended to confer
upon the court jurisdiction as developed in equity in England at that
time."' 20 Indeed, early jurists believed the "and" in the clause of the law and
equity portion of the Constitution required separate rules and separate
causes of action. 2' In addition, the Federal Rules of Equity, first adopted by
the Court in 1822, stated whenever existing rules in the United States did
not apply to a case in equity, "the practice of the Circuit Courts shall be
regulated by the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England."'22
This rule was modified twenty years later to state that the practice of the
High Court of Chancery in England may be used "not as positive rules, but
as furnishing just analogies to regulate the practice."'' 23
While the United States did not have a separate court system to hear
cases in equity, the Federal Rules of Equity governed all federal equity cas-
es until 1938, when they were merged with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 24 However, the Supreme Court in 1893 stressed equity's service to
the law, holding in Hedges v. Dixon County: 125
Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provi-
sions than can courts of law. They are bound by positive provisions of a statute equally with
courts of law, and where the transaction, or the contract, is declared void because not in
compliance with express statutory or constitutional provision, a court of equity cannot inter-
pose to give validity to such transaction or contract, or any part thereof. 1
26
117 Kroger,supranote Ill1,at 1438.
118 U.S.CONST. art. III, § 2.
119 Bean v. Smith, 2 F. Cas. 1143, 1150 (C.C.D.R.I. 1821).
120 JOSEPH STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 28 (W.H. Lyon, Jr. ed., 14th ed. 1918) (1835) (referring to Pub. Stats. Ch. 151 § 4); see
also Main, supra note 83, at 450.
121 JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 2 (8th ed. 1933) (1913).
122 Federal Equity Rule 38, reprinted in HOPKINS, supra note 121, at 42.
123 Federal Equity Rule 90, reprinted in HOPKINS, supra note 12 1, at 61.
124 Main, supra note 83, at 431.
125 150U.S. 182 (1893).
126 Id. at 192.
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A. Laches and the Supreme Court
As pointed out in a 1998 article, there are few historical discussions of
Supreme Court equity jurisprudence. 27 Professor Kroger argues there were
two models for equity jurisdiction, one highly discretionary and the other
more formal and constrained. 128 This plays out in these early laches cases as
a "lack of interest" in precedent. 29 Professor Kroger argues that between
1789 and 1801, the Court cited to only two cases in their seventeen equity
opinions. 30 However, with the advent of Marshall's Court, highly influ-
enced by Blackstone,"' the Court began using a more modem, familiar
decision style, dispensing with seriatum opinions for the most part. A
result of this change was the Court's refusal to use laches in some cases
because of its elastic tendencies.'33 However, according to Professor
Kroger, the Court's philosophy swung back as the Marshall Court aged,
evoking a description by Kroger of the Court's equity jurisdiction as "un-
principled discretion" and a definition of which would be familiar to those
reading City of Sherrill. "[T]he Court never admits that its equitable justice
is, in every case, discretionary. Instead, the Court claims that its reasoning
is formal, outcome-neutral, and precedent-bound when that approach serves
its own purpose, but invokes discretionary powers when it wishes to inter-
vene to protect powerful or highly valued interests."' While the Supreme
Court has developed precedent around the equitable defense of laches and
decided a highly cited case on the defense as recently as 196 1, ' the City of
Sherrill Court cited to far older cases in its discussion that themselves rely
on the older English cases. The 1843 case cited in City of Sherrill was
Bowman v. Wathen. 136 The case concerned the competing claims of a ferry
permit, one of many cases concerning the development of new cities, terri-
tories, and states as each entity purported to pass valid title to different de-
visees.13 1 The defendants considered their title to be settled for at least
thirty-eight years and, while the court acknowledged the defendants likely
maintained their ferry for profit, the "undertaking [was] highly promotive
of public advantage."' This is illuminating because of the Court's adop-
127 Kroger, supra note 111, at 1428 n.14.
128 ld. at 1440.
129 id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1447.
132 Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegra-
tion, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 192-93 (1959).
133 Kroger, supra note 11, at 1453.
134 Id. at 1466.
135 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
136 42 U.S. (1 How.) 189 (1843).
137 Id. at 190-91.
138 Id. at 195.
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tion of weighing public rights and interests against the implementation of
laches. In the Court's discussion of laches, the Court cited approvingly to
Smith v. Clay,'39 an English case from 1767.14° In that case, Lord Camden
discussed a petition to review a decree that was between thirty and forty
years old. 141 While he stated that, after twenty years, most appeals would be
barred:
A court of equity which is never active in relief against conscience, or public convenience,
has always refused its aid to stale demands, where the party has slept upon his right and ac-
quiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity, but con-
science, good faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the [c]ourt is passive,
and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and therefore from the
beginning of this jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits in this court. 142
The Supreme Court and English courts have frequently referred to
Smith v. Clay when defining laches. 143 It is one of the first laches cases to
cite to its own precedent, Edwards v. Carroll"4 and Fitton v. Lord Maccles-
field. 45 Tracing laches through precedent stops at these cases (from 1760
and 1684, respectively). 146 Lord Macclesfield held that "though there be no
limitation of time to the bringing a bill of review; yet after two and twenty
years he should not reverse a decree, but upon very apparent and flat er-
rors."' 147 In addition, Smith v. Clay stands for the proposition that "when the
Legislature ha[s] fixed the time at law, it would have been preposterous for
equity (which, by its own proper authority, always maintained a limitation),
to countenance laches beyond the period, that law had been confined to by
parliament."'' 4t
While these historic cases generally find length of time a bar, they still
illustrate a way for the plaintiff to argue against the application of laches.
For example, in Wagner v. Baird,149 a case cited in City of Sherrill,50 the
Court stated that length of time "operates by way of presumption in favor of
139 (1767) 3 Bro. C.C. 646, 29 Eng. Rep. 743, 745 (Ch.).
140 Wathen, 42 U.S. at 193 ("They have been imbodied by Lord Camden, with a succinctness, and
at the same time with a comprehensiveness, compressing within a few sentences almost a system of
equity jurisprudence .... ").
141 Smith, 29 Eng. Rep. at 744.
142 Id. (emphasis added).
143 See, e.g., Wathen, 42 U.S. at 193.
144 (1760) 2 Bro. P.C. 98, 1 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch.).
145 (1684) 1 Vein 287, 23 Eng. Rep. 474 (Ch.). Fitton is transcribed as "Fitter" in Smith.
146 See Main, supra note 83, at 447-48. Carroll was decided around the time the courts of the
chancery began using precedent to decide cases. Cases after Carroll tend to cite precedent, cases before
tend not to, at least regarding laches. See id.
147 Lord Macclesfield, 23 Eng. Rep. at 477.
148 Smith, 29 Eng. Rep. at 744.
149 48 U.S. (7 How.) 234 (1849).
150 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005).
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the party in possession."'' However, it also held that "[l]ong acquiescence
and laches ... cannot be excused but by showing some actual hindrance or
impediment caused by the fraud or concealment of the party in possession
.... ,"52 Badger v. Badger,5' the primary case cited by the City of Sherrill
Court for the proposition that equity courts refuse old cases "for the peace
of society,"' 54 also stated that "[t]he numerous cases in the books as to dis-
missing a chancery bill because of staleness, would seem to be contradic-
tory if the dicta of the chancellors are not modified by applying them to the
peculiar facts of the case under consideration."'
Costello v. United States,'56 a Supreme Court case from 1961, is often
cited for the definition of laches. '57 When the Supreme Court decided Cos-
tello, it cited multiple cases to come up with its two-step definition of la-
ches. 5 Those cases included Galliher v. Cadwell, '59 which argued that past
cases "all proceed upon the theory that laches is not, like limitation, a mere
matter of time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the
claim to be enforced, an inequity founded upon some change in the condi-
tion or relations of the property or the parties." 60 Costello also cited South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Bogert,' which stated, "[n]or does failure, long contin-
ued, to discover the appropriate remedy, though well known, establish la-
ches where there has been due diligence, and, as the lower courts have here
found, the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay."' 62 Finally, the Court
cited to Gardner v. Panama Railroad Co.,'63 which discussed laches as an
elastic defense:
Though the existence of laches is a question primarily addressed to the discretion of the trial
court, the matter should not be determined merely by a reference to and a mechanical appli-
cation of the statute of limitations. The equities of the parties must be considered as well.
151 Baird, 48 U.S. at 258.
152 id.
153 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 87 (1864).
154 City ofSherrill, 544 U.S. at 217.
155 Badger, 69 U.S. at 92.
156 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
157 E.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002); New Jersey v. New
York, 523 U.S. 767, 806 (1998); Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995).
158 Costello, 365 U.S. at 282 ("Laches requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against
whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense." (citing Galliher v.
Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 372 (1892); S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 488-90 (1919); Gardner v.
Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951))).
159 145 U.S. 368 (1892).
160 Id. at 373.
161 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
162 Id. at 490.
163 342 U.S. 29 (1951).
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Where there has been no inexcusable delay in seeking a remedy and where no prejudice to
the defendant has ensued from the mere passage of time, there should be no bar to relief.
164
Most recently, Costello's laches definition was quoted by the Supreme
Court in 2002.165 While the Court was not reaching a finding on laches, it
was trying to illustrate some defenses an employer might use against a Title
VII suit. 166 However, even with all of this precedent and historical back-
ground, the Court in City of Sherrill did not use these cases and, in failing
to do so, created a new defense for states and cities against Indian land and
treaty claims.
B. New Laches: Acquiescence and Impossibility in City of Sherrill
New laches is the merging of acquiescence, impossibility, and the de-
lay prong of laches. Acquiescence and impossibility were both used by the
City of Sherrill Court.'67 Acquiescence, like laches, is based in history and
precedent, and was also an equitable defense. 6 8 Acquiescence is at times
confused with laches, but commentators insist there is a distinct difference
between them.'69 Acquiescence requires knowledge by the plaintiff at the
time of the wrong and requires the plaintiff to actively assent to the per-
formance. 7 ' An English case from 1861 held: "acquiescence . . . imports
knowledge, for I do not see how a man can be said to have acquiesced in
what he did not know."'' In addition, the case of De Bussche v. Alt'72 held
that acquiescence cannot happen after the injury has occurred because
"[m]ere submission to the injury for any time short of the period limited by
statute for the enforcement of the right of action cannot take away such
right [to sue]."' 73
While acquiescence has been used in other legal settings, most Su-
preme Court jurisprudence is in the area of state boundary disputes. Indeed,
164 Id. at 30-31.
165 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002).
166 Id. at 121-22.
167 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 218-21 (2005).
168 See, e.g., Wagner v. Baird, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 234, 258 (1849) (explaining that courts of equity
often refuse to interfere in cases where long acquiescence to an asserted adverse right has occurred).
169 See 4 POMEROY, supra note 114, § 1440, at 3410 ("The subject is further complicated by a
hopeless confusion in nomenclature. The term 'acquiescence,' in one of its two legal significations, is
often used interchangeably with the term 'laches'....").
170 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 63 (2008).
171 Life Ass'n of Scotland v. Siddal, (1861) 3 De G.F. & J. 58, 45 Eng. Rep. 800, 806 (Ch.).
172 (1878) 8 Ch.D. 286.
173 Id. at 314.
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these are the cases the Court cited in City of Sherrill.174 In most of these
cases, years go by with one state exercising sovereignty, such as taxation
and civil regulation, over a piece of land. 175 Eventually, a second state chal-
lenges that exercise and argues that the piece of land should belong to the
second state. 176 The case must go to the Supreme Court under its limited
original jurisdiction. 177 In one of the earliest of these cases, Indiana and
Kentucky fought over the ownership of Green River Island. 178 In seeking to
resolve the conflict, the Supreme Court relied on the finding that, for sev-
enty years, Indiana "never exercised, or attempted to exercise, a single right
of sovereignty or ownership over its soil."' 79 Therefore, Indiana's "acquies-
cence in the assertion of authority by the state of Kentucky, such omission
to take any steps to assert her present claim by the state of Indiana, can only
be regarded as a recognition of the right of Kentucky too plain to be over-
come except by the clearest and most unquestioned proof."' 8 ° This case was
cited approvingly by the Court in 192681 and in 1973,112 which are two of
the acquiescence cases cited by the City of Sherrill Court. 3
A traditional difference between acquiescence and laches is that the
Court will generally not apply laches to land claims between states, even
when the claim is old.'84 This is a small distinction, but nonetheless, claims
between states are not summarily barred based on the length of time since
the start of the claim. 185 One illustrative case demonstrates this distinction.
In a dispute between Rhode Island and Massachusetts, all that was required
of Rhode Island to avoid dismissal based on laches was to "aver[] that she
never acquiesced in the boundary claimed by the defendant, but has con-
tinually resisted it, since she discovered the mistake; and that she has been
prevented from prosecuting her claim, at an earlier day, by the circumstance
mentioned in her bill."'86 Massachusetts agreed that Rhode Island "never
acquiesced, and has, from time to time, made efforts to regain the territory,
by negotiations with Massachusetts, and was prevented . . . from appealing
174 544 U.S. 197, 218 (2005) (citing California v. Nevada, 477 U.S. 125 (1980); Ohio v. Kentucky,
410 U.S. 641 (1973); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295 (1926); Massachusetts v. New York, 271
U.S. 65 (1926)).
175 See, e.g., Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 509-10 (1890).
176 Id.
177 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
178 Indiana, 136 U.S. at 503.
179 Id. at510.
180 id.
181 Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295, 319 (1926).
182 Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 651 (1973).
183 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 218 (2005).
184 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 233, 273 (1841).
185 Id.
186 Id. at272.
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to the proper tribunal to grant her redress."'87 This boundary claim dispute,
which one lawyer claimed was about "territory [that] is densely inhabited,
and under a high state of improvement; . . it is occupied by seven thousand
people, all of whom, as did their ancestors to remotest time, deem them-
selves to be citizens, and most of them native citizens of Massachusetts;
and that there is upon it not less than a million dollars of taxable prop-
erty,"'88 was nearly one hundred years old.'89 Laches did not bar the claim
because "here two political communities are concerned, who cannot act
with the same promptness as individuals."'90
Both laches and acquiescence in City of Sherrill have historical under-
pinnings, but the City of Sherrill Court's use of "impossibility" does not
comport with any historical understanding of that remedy. Impossibility, as
an equitable doctrine, was only used in contract cases where it would be
"impossible" for one party to perform on the contract. 11' The preeminent
case in this area is Taylor v. Caldwell,'92 which involved the destruction of
a music hall before the contracted performances could be held.' The court
held that "[t]he principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which the
performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing,
a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the
perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance."' 94 While
Taylor v. Caldwell is the most recognized of impossibility cases, one com-
mentator has found English cases from as early as 1536 that allowed impos-
sibility as an excuse for performance. 9 ' However, impossibility as a rem-
edy does not exist outside of contracts (and a narrow area of criminal law),
except as the Supreme Court used it in City of Sherrill. '96 According to City
of Sherrill, the doctrine of impossibility stands for the proposition that any
exercise of tribal sovereignty that might have "disruptive practical conse-
quences" is impossible.'97 This is not the understanding of impossibility in
any other legal circumstance. For instance, the Court relied on Yankton
Sioux v. United States. '98 However, the Court's reliance on Yankton Sioux is
problematic because the Court's use of it in City of Sherrill is based on dic-
187 Id.
188 Id. at 236.
189 Id. at 265.
190 Rhode Island, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 273.
191 See James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 513, 513-14 (2004).
192 (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.).
193 Id. at 310.
194 Id. at 314.
195 Gordley, supra note 191, at 521 & n.52.
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 36(c) (1981); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 120 (2008).
197 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 219-21 (2005).
198 272 U.S. 351 (1926).
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ta in Yankton Sioux.'99 The Supreme Court heard the Yankton Sioux case as
it was appealed through the Court of Claims.20 0 In a treaty from 1858, the
Yankton Band of Santee Sioux reserved 400,000 acres of land known as the
red pipestone quarries. 20' After years of pressure on the tribe by non-Indian
squatters, federal agents, and Congress to give up title and rights to the qua-
rries, the Yankton Sioux finally had their claim heard by the Supreme
Court.2 °2 The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the red pipe-
stone quarries had been wrongly taken by the United States, and if so, what
just compensation the tribe deserved. 2 3 The federal government, basing its
argument on an 1894 agreement with the tribe it claimed was void, argued
the federal government owned the land and, therefore, did not owe just
compensation.2 "4 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the provision
otherwise. The provision of the 1894 agreement stated that if Congress
questioned the ownership of the Pipestone reservation, the Secretary of the
Interior was to refer the question to the Supreme Court within one year.
205 If
the matter was not referred within the year, the land would automatically
become the tribe's in fee. 0 6 Because referring the matter to the Supreme
Court would be an illegal expansion of the Court's original jurisprudence,
the federal government claimed the clause was impossible, and therefore
the entire agreement void.20 7
Congress eventually authorized the Court of Claims to hear the case
because, while the land was reserved to the tribe in an 1858 treaty, it had
been forced open to settlement by the actions of the railroad, federal agents,
and Congress."' Once the claim arrived in the Supreme Court, the federal
government argued the tribe did not own the land in fee because the 1894
agreement was void." 9 The Court found, however, that the second portion
of the clause, which passed fee to the tribe if the government did not act,
199 Id. at 357.
200 Id. at 352-53.
201 Id. at 353-54.
202 William P. Corbett, The Red Pipestone Quarry: The Yanktons Defend a Sacred Tradition,
1858-1929, 8 South Dakota History 99, 101-14 (Winter 1977). Indeed, the Congressional Task Force
that prepared the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report stated "this quarry was deliberately
damaged by the construction of a railroad through it in 1891 at the instigation of federal officials and
missionaries who wished to destroy its value as a religious site." Department of the Interior, American
Indian Religious Freedom Act Report, P.L. 95-341, at 14 (Aug. 1979).
203 Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 353.
204 Id. at 354-55.
205 Id. at 355.
206 Id.
207 See id at 355-58. It is not clear from the record why the federal government did not argue the
agreement was unconstitutional. According to the Court, the Secretary of the Interior "conclude[d] that
the provision for referring the matter to this court was beyond the constitutional power of Congress." Id.
at 355.
208 Corbett, supra note 202, at 106-07.
209 See Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 356-58.
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was an alternative option that was not impossible." ' Therefore, finding the
agreement void because of the impossible term would be "most inequitable
and utterly indefensible on any moral ground .. ".. .2 The tribe held the
land in fee, but it was agreed that the federal government was in possession.
The Court awarded "just compensation" to the tribe for the taking by the
government.212
Yankton Sioux is now cited for the proposition that if there are two al-
ternative manners of performing on a contract, and one is impossible, the
contract is not rendered void if the alternate manner is available.2 3 Various
federal courts have cited this case for this proposition and go so far as to
state that the case is "[o]ne of the best examples of the application of this
doctrine .... 21 4 The only time the Court in Yankton Sioux specifically dis-
cussed equity was when it addressed the federal government's attempt to
claim the entire agreement void because of the impossibility of perform-
ance. 215 In dicta, the Court did state that returning land to the Indians that
had already been sold to "innocent" purchasers would be "impossible. 2 6
The ultimate holding of the case, however, was that the United States took
the land, and the tribe was due just compensation for the taking.2 7
Yankton Sioux did not create a new impossibility defense for Indian
land claims. Rather, it expressed a new wrinkle to the contracts impossibil-
ity defense. The City of Sherrill Court, however, cited the case for the
stance that the "Court has recognized the impracticability of returning to
Indian control land that generations earlier passed into numerous private
hands." '218
The City of Sherrill Court used pieces of acquiescence, impossibility,
and laches to create the new laches defense. For example, the City of Sher-
rill Court pulled from acquiescence the notion that simple length of time
can bar a claim. Specifically, the City of Sherrill Court noted that "long-
standing observances and settled expectations are prime considerations" in
210 Id. at357-58.
211 Id. at 357.
212 Id. at 359.
213 See, e.g., Brangier v. Rosenthal, 337 F.2d 952, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1964); Crowley v. Commodity
Exch., 141 F.2d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 1944).
214 Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 462 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1972).
215 Yankton Sioux, 272 U.S. at 359.
216 Id. at 357 ("It is impossible, however, to rescind the cession and restore the Indians to their
former rights, because the lands have been opened to settlement and large portions of them are now in
the possession of innumerable innocent purchasers, and nothing remains but to sanction a great injustice
or enforce the alternative agreement of the United States in respect of the ownership of the Indians.").
217 Id. at 359.
218 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 219 (2005). Of course, in Yankton Sioux
the land had only been in "private hands" for twenty-six years, hardly "generations." Yankton Sioux, 272
U.S. at 352-55.
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a land claim.2 9 The Court even went so far as to state that "[t]he acquies-
cence doctrine does not depend on the original validity of a boundary line;
rather, it attaches legal consequences to acquiescence in the observance of
the boundary" which divides the taking of land in violation of federal law
from the consequences of that taking. 2 ° This reasoning helps eliminate any
need to evaluate past inequities in the face of the current situation, focusing
court opinions back on disruption of current landowners rather than a more
traditional weighing of equities.
The Court's discussion of impossibility is consistent with the larger
creation of the defense of new laches. Impossibility is part of the disruption
portion of new laches. The language used by the Eastern District of New
York in Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York221 demonstrates the court's
understanding that the defense used in these cases is new and not closely
related to traditional laches. For example, the judge in Shinnecock stated
that Cayuga "unveiled" three principles relating to laches and Indian land
claims-that equitable defenses apply to disruptive claims, equitable de-
fenses apply at law and equity, and equitable defenses can apply at the
pleadings stage.222 The judge in Shinnecock concluded that these concepts
were "unveiled. 2 ' The word choice of "unveiled" is telling of a lack of
supporting precedent other than Cayuga and Sherrill. Interestingly, the
judge in Shinnecock also pointed out that the facts in City of Sherrill caused
the Supreme Court to "initiate" the impossibility doctrine.224 While the
Shinnecock court held against the tribe, the judge's language reveals an
understanding of this defense as fundamentally different from precedent.
The revealing of "new" doctrines and understanding of the law was done
specifically to find against Indian land claims and is not used in any other
area of law. This distinction recognizes the shaky basis on which City of
Sherrill and its progeny were decided. Ultimately, these cases undermine
the rule of law because they lead to only one conclusion; the new laches
defense was created for one purpose-to defeat tribal claims. 25
219 City ofSherrill, 544 U.S. at 218.
220 Id.
221 No. 05-CV-2887, 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006).
222 Id. at *4.
223 id
224 Id. at *5.
225 See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 275-76 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Plaintiffs urge us to
conclude that, as a legal remedy, ejectment is not subject to equitable defenses, relying, inter alia, on the
Supreme Court's statement in Oneida II that 'application of the equitable defense of laches in an action
at law would be novel indeed.' . . . One of the few incontestable propositions about this unusually com-
plex and confusing area of law is that doctrines and categorizations applicable in other areas do not
translate neatly to these claims.... In light of the unusual considerations at play in this area of the law,
and our agreement that ordinary common law principles are indeed 'not readily transferrable to this
action,' we see no reason why the equitable principles identified by the Supreme Court in Sberril [sic]
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However, it may be possible to identify some distinct rules regarding
new laches, especially as these rules conflict with maxims surrounding tra-
ditional laches. Traditional laches is about delay and injury; new laches is
about delay and disruption. 226 Traditional laches is an equitable defense;
new laches is both a legal and equitable defense. 227 Traditional laches re-
quires an evaluation of the facts and "equities" of the case; new laches can
apply at the pleadings stage. 228 Traditional laches is generally not applied if
a statute of limitations already is in place; new laches can (and will) apply
within a statute of limitations 9.2 2  Traditional laches usually requires clean
hands; new laches does not.23 Traditional laches does not usually apply to a
sovereign; new laches has applied to sovereigns, but this question is open at
the Supreme Court level and has only been discussed in one case. 23' All of
these distinctions demonstrate why countering a traditional laches argument
has not worked for tribes.
C. New Laches as Precedent in the Lower Federal Courts
Understanding that the "laches" defense used in City of Sherrill and its
progeny is related to traditional laches in name only is the key to facing this
defense in federal courts. Arguments related to traditional laches have re-
peatedly failed in the Second Circuit. 232 Given that precedent, it would seem
unlikely that they will prevail elsewhere. This new laches is a combination
of the Supreme Court's discussion of impossibility, acquiescence, and la-
ches.233 Impossibility and acquiescence have their own difficult history, and
later cases have combined them into one discussion of laches. These discus-
sions in various opinions (almost all in the Second Circuit) lay out some
major distinctions between laches and new laches.
should not apply to this case, whether or not it could be technically classified as an action at law." (cita-
tions omitted)).
226 Compare 30(A) C.J.S. Equity § 147 (2008), with City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544
U.S. 197, 215 n.9, 219 (2005).
227 Compare 30A C.J.S. Equity § 138 (2007), with Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 276.
228 Compare 30A C.J.S. Equity § 142 (2007), with Shinnecock, 2006 WL 3501099, at *4.
229 Compare 30A C.J.S. Equity § 138, with Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 273.
230 Compare Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 17, Onondaga Nation v.
New York, No. 05-CV-00314 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006) (arguing that, in a land claim case by the
Onondaga Nation where the State of New York raised the defense of laches, New York did not come to
court with clean hands as it acquired the land in dispute in violation of federal law), with 30A C.J.S.
Equity § 109 (2007).
231 Compare Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961) (collecting cases that hold that
laches is not a defense against the sovereign), with City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-14.
232 See, e.g., Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 279.
233 See supra Part III.B.
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1. Definitional Change: Delay and Injury v. Delay and Disruption
There are many differences between new laches and traditional laches,
but the most important is the difference in their basic definition. Traditional
laches has two requirements: delay and injury or prejudice.134 New laches
also has two requirements, but they are delay and disruption.235 Articles,
testimony, and briefs have demonstrated that tribes did not delay in bring-
ing their claim, that tribes were prevented from being heard in the courts,
and that in working to bring their claim, the defendants were aware of these
claims.236 As discussed earlier, the Rhode Island case demonstrates the
proposition that when a party cannot avail itself of a court, laches should
not apply to a delay.2 37 One author also notes that "defendants may not as-
sert laches against a plaintiff whose delay is justified, even if the defendant
is prejudiced by the delay."23 Either of these statements would apply to
most Indian land claims.
Rather than focusing on the equities of delay, the courts are instead fo-
cusing on the disruption to the current landowners. By the time the Second
Circuit interpreted new laches in Cayuga, the land claims themselves were
inherently "disruptive." '239 Prejudice, on the other hand, requires a showing
by the defendant of a change in circumstances such that the defendant is
injured by the plaintiff bringing the claim late.24° While it can hardly be
argued that the circumstances surrounding the land accounted for in most of
the New York claims have not changed, there are multiple reasons why this
is a specious argument. First, in City of Sherrill, the land in question, again,
was held by the Nation.24' The defendants were not forced to argue what
prejudice it would suffer by the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Second, in
Cayuga, the Nation argued for two remedies, monetary damages or eject-
ment.242 The Nation continued arguing for the ejectment remedy because it
felt the monetary award at the lower court level was not enough to compen-
sate for the taking.243 The Second Circuit did not need to reach the discus-
234 30A C.J.S. Equity § 147 (2008).
235 City ofSherrill, 544 U.S. at 215 n.9, 219; see also Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 277.
236 See, e.g., Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 16-21, Onondaga Nation v. New
York, No. 05-CV-00314 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006); Singer, supra note 4, at 627.
237 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. 233, 272 (1841).
238 Joseph Mack, Nullum Tempus: Governmental Immunity to Statutes of Limitation, Laches, and
Statutes of Repose, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 180, 183 (2006).
239 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 277 ("'[D]isruptive,' forward-looking claims, a category exemplified by
possessory land claims, are subject to equitable defenses, including laches.").
240 Thomas G. Robinson, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statute of Limitations, 56
B.U. L. REV. 970, 971-72 (1976).
241 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211-12 (2005).
242 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 269.
243 Reply Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants Cayuga Indian Nation and Seneca Cayuga Tribe,
413 F.3d 266 (2005), 2003 WL 24300621, at * 1-2 (Nov. 11,2003).
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sion of ejectment. The court could have affirmed or increased the district
court's award of monetary relief, which would not be prejudicial to other
landowners as it would not affect their ownership or title to the land.244 Fi-
nally, as one commentator writes, laches "exacts of the plaintiff no more
than fair dealing with his adversary." '245 The prejudice behind laches implies
a plaintiff holding on to his claim until the defendant will certainly be in-
jured by bringing the claim itself. 246
Disruption, on the other hand, requires none of these things. Simply
the bringing of the claim is disruptive. 247 The defendant is not required to
show how the claim will be prejudicial. The claim does not even have to
touch the title of the landowners. Disruption, in other words, is a lower
standard than prejudice.
Disruption also takes part of its definition under new laches from im-
possibility because, in the Supreme Court's circular reasoning, any disrup-
tion of current landowners would be impossible and thus disruptive. 248 Dis-
ruption evokes images of innocent parties subject to forces beyond their
control, forced off their land or otherwise "disrupting" their lifestyle.214 9 It
implies that the exercise of tribal sovereignty is inherently disruptive rather
than orderly. 5° A fear of disruption weighs heavily in the courts, and the
disruption of the current landowners has so far weighed more heavily than
the inequities toward tribes, as shown by the almost universal losses by
tribes when faced with new laches.25 Even demonstrating the tribe did not
actually delay in bringing the claim has so far been futile against the court's
244 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 272.
245 4 POMEROY, supra note 114, § 1443, at 3423.
246 See 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 419(d), at 177 (Spencer
Symons ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1992).
247 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 277 ("[T]he import of Sherrill is that 'disruptive,' forward-looking claims,
a category exemplified by possessory land claims, are subject to equitable defenses, including laches.").
248 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 219 (2005) ("[Tihe unilateral reestab-
lishment of present and future Indian sovereign control, even over land purchased at the market price,
would have disruptive practical consequences similar to those that led this Court in Yankton Sioux to
initiate the impossibility doctrine.").
249 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275 ("Under the Sherrill formulation, this type of possessory land claim-
seeking possession of a large swath of central New York State and the ejectment of tens of thousands of
landowners-is indisputably disruptive. Indeed, this disruptiveness is inherent in the claim itself-
which asks this Court to overturn years of settled land ownership ...."); Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep't of
Natural Res., 541 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (N.D. Ohio 2008) ("Allowing Plaintiff to hunt and fish within
these public lands would create a significant disruption for visitors to the state parks ....").
250 See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220 ("If OIN may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and
remove these parcels from the local tax rolls, little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new genera-
tion of litigation to free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that protect all land-
owners in the area."); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Vill. of Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) ("If avoidance of taxation is disruptive, avoidance of complying with local zoning and
land use laws is no less disruptive. In fact, it is even more disruptive.").
251 See supra Part I (discussing cases decided since City of Sherrill).
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perception of potential disruption in allowing the claim to proceed.252 This
implies that the disruption prong of new laches is more important than the
delay prong, dooming tribes that only argue against the delay aspect of new
laches.
2. Theoretical Change: Equitable Defense v. Legal Defense
As discussed above, traditional laches is a product of the English
courts of equity and was imported to U.S. courts through the constitutional
clause allowing the Supreme Court to hear cases in both "law and eq-
uity. ' 253 It is true that the difference between the cases in law and cases in
equity has blurred significantly.254 Federal courts never had separate equity
and law courts, though there were separate rules of procedure for both until
1934.2"' When law and equity merged, however, there still existed specific
differences between claims brought in equity and claims brought in law.
Applicable to this discussion is the general rule that equitable defenses can
only be used against claims for equitable remedies.256 As the Supreme
Court stated in County of Oneida (Oneida I1), "application of the equitable
defense of laches in an action at law would be novel indeed.
257
"[A]bolishing the law-equity distinction," as one commentator noted,
"may increase the risk that courts would treat [equitable] defenses as all-or-
nothing propositions." '58 Because using equity and equitable defenses still
allows the plaintiff to bring a claim at law, barring the claim using an equi-
table defense was often not the end of the case.259 However, since new la-
ches applies to legal claims as well as equitable claims, new laches be-
comes an all-or-nothing proposition, barring Indian land claims at the first
whiff of disruption.
In City of Sherrill, the Oneida Indian Nation did not specifically re-
quest an equitable remedy.260 In their brief, the Nation wrote:
252 See supra text accompanying notes 236-49.
253 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
254 See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 8 (2007) (noting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "abolishe[d] the
procedural distinctions between actions and the forms of actions at law and in equity, so that there is
now only one form of civil action in the federal courts, and legal and equitable remedies may be admin-
istered in the same forum and in the same action").
255 Main, supra note 83, at471.
256 Shelby D. Green, Specific Relieffor Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REv. 245,
280 (2003).
257 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,244 n.16 (1985).
258 Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1238 (1990).
259 Id. at 1240.
260 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211-12 (2005).
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In Oneida II, the Court left open whether "equitable considerations" might limit ejectment as
a remedy with respect to land that is not in the Oneidas' possession. The issue here is not re-
medy for dispossession, but protection of actual possession accompanied by an unextin-
guished federally protected possessory right.
2 61
However, the City of Sherrill Court characterized the Nation's claim as
seeking "equitable relief prohibiting, currently and in the future, the imposi-
tion of property taxes. 2 62 By framing the case in this manner, the Court was
able to introduce equitable defenses into a legal claim.
Refraining the tribe's claim was not limited to the City of Sherrill de-
cision. Other cases in the Second Circuit have been refrained from a legal to
an equitable claim, even if the tribe expressly stated the claim was not equi-
table.2 63 This gives the courts the ability to apply "laches" (actually new
laches) rather than focusing on the legal discussion. In Cayuga, the original
claim for ejectment was also a legal remedy.2"
3. Application Change: Evaluating the Equities v. Summary
Judgment
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of new laches is the extent to
which the court is willing to use it. Traditional laches requires a balancing
of equities.265 As has been quoted previously, laches is not simply the pas-
sage of time.266 For example, in 1857, an English court held: "[m]ere lapse
of time does not bar in equity any more than at law: it is an ingredient
which, with other circumstances, may lead the Court to draw inferences
unfavourable to the claim of a party who has let twenty or nearly twenty
years elapse without asserting his right. 2 67 Traditional laches is an elastic
defense, which requires some work on the part of the defendant to demon-
strate why the shield of laches should apply to him.
As noted above, in a boundary dispute between Rhode Island and
Massachusetts, Rhode Island avoided dismissal of its claim based on laches
261 Brief for Respondents at 19, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (No.
03-855) (citation omitted).
262 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 212.
263 Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 2005).
264 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 274, 276. In finding laches did apply to a legal claim, the Cayuga court
used the "complexity" of federal Indian law against the tribe, stating that "[iun light of the unusual
considerations at play in this area of the law, and our agreement that ordinary common law principles
are indeed 'not readily transferable to this action,' we see no reason why the equitable principles identi-
fied by the Supreme Court in Sberrill [sic] should not apply to this case, whether or not it could be
technically classified as an action at law." Id.
265 See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 142 (2007).
266 See supra text accompanying note 110.
267 Penny v. Allen, (1857) 7 De G.M. & G. 409, 426,44 Eng. Rep. 160, 166 (Ch.).
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because the state did not acquiesce to the boundary. 268 The avoidance of
dismissal was primarily based on the fact that laches should not be weighed
on the pleadings.269 No plaintiff, particularly one specifically not arguing an
equitable claim, would argue against laches. That would require the plain-
tiff to anticipate the defendant's laches defense, essentially forcing the
plaintiff to plea the defendant's unclean hands. Because traditional laches
requires a balancing of the equities and is deployed as a defense to a claim
for equitable remedy, dismissing a claim at the 12(b)(6) stage simply ig-
nores the basic requirements of laches. In doing this, the courts are using
new laches, which can be dispatched at the earliest opportunity, because
any forward movement on the case would bring "disruption" to the defen-
dants.270
4. Procedural Change: Statute of Limitations v. Discretionary Limits
Historically, laches has been obedient to statutes of limitations; if a
statute of limitations exists, laches must follow that time frame.27' In a case
both highly cited and citing to Smith v. Clay, Lord Redesdale wrote, "I
think it is a mistake in point of language to say that Courts of Equity act
merely by analogy to the statutes; they act in obedience to them. ' 27 2 He
went on to write:
I think, therefore, courts of equity are bound to yield obedience to the statute of limitations
upon all legal titles and legal demands, and cannot act contrary to the spirit of its provisions.
I think the statute must be taken virtually to include courts of equity; for when the legislature
by statute limited the proceedings at law in certain cases, and provided no express limitations
for proceedings in equity, it must be taken to have contemplated that equity followed the law,
and therefore, it must be taken to have virtually enacted in the same cases a limitation for
courts of equity also. 
273
268 See supra text accompanying notes 186-90.
269 See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 233, 273-74 (1841) (holding that the issue
of whether the delay in bringing the complaint was justified could not be disposed of on the pleadings).
270 Pl.s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3, Onondaga Nation v. State of New
York, No. 05-CV-00314 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006) ("Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(c) requires that affirmative
defenses, such as laches, 'must be set forth affirmatively.' Further, Rule 12 requires that such affirma-
tive defenses be raised in a pleading, not in a Rule 12(b) motion. Thus, the equitable defenses of laches,
acquiescence and impossibility are not appropriate subjects for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, be-
cause they are fact-based, affirmative defenses that raise matters outside the complaint.").
271 DOBBS, supra note 43, at 77.
272 Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 607, 629 (1806). See also Robinson, supra note 240, at
973-74 (claiming that the "federally developed laches doctrine applies only to those claims based upon
federal equitable or maritime rights for which Congress has neglected to establish a limitations period"
(emphasis added)).
273 Hovenden, 2 Sch. & Lef. at 630.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 385 2008-2009
GEO. MASON L. REV.
In the absence of a statute of limitations, courts of equity looked to
analogous statutes and then weighed the equities. 274 However, without a
statute of limitations, mere length of time was not enough to invoke the
laches defense. 275 As one U.S. commenter wrote, "a thousand years in the
sight of the Chancellor are but as yesterday. ' '276 If the claim is a legal one
and there is still no statute of limitations, laches will not apply because the
claim is legal, not equitable.277
However, the courts have applied laches to legal Indian land claims,
which are supposed to be governed by an applicable statute of limita-
tions.278 The Indian Claims Limitation Act specifically states that no time
bar will govern in cases "for bringing an action to establish the title to, or
the right of possession of, real or personal property. '279 As in other areas of
Indian land claims, the courts apply new laches while ignoring both con-
gressional intent and the rules surrounding laches.28°
5. Doctrinal Change: Clean Hands v. Illegal Actions
A basic maxim in all of equitable jurisprudence, not just laches, is "he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. 2 1 Unclean hands is
an equitable defense, generally used against the plaintiff.282 However, as
one author writes, "the point ... is not that the plaintiffs unclean hands
furnish a 'defense' to the defendant, but rather that the court itself wishes to
avoid participating in iniquity. ' 283 Unclean hands often refers to illegality or
fraud associated with the claim the plaintiff brings, specifically if the plain-
tiff is "seeking to secure a benefit 'from the very conduct' which is inequi-
table. 284 In current tribal land claims, the tribes are often the plaintiffs, so
that the plaintiffs would be put in the position of arguing the defense of
274 See Hedgcs v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893); see also Heriot, supra note 65, at 953
("In situations that require courts to apply the laches doctrine, they simply apply the period specified in
the most analogous statute of limitations ....").
275 See supra text accompanying note 110.
276 Pepper, supra note 2, at 331.
277 Green, supra note 256, at 280.
278 E.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 2005).
279 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c) (2000).
280 See generally Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1143 (1990) (examining four other areas of fed-
eral Indian law and concluding that "[i]n each area, reference to congressional intent does not support
the results of the principal cases").
281 21 C. § 163 (1920).
282 DOBBS, supra note 43, at 68.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 70.
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unclean hands of the defendant.285 However, it has been amply illustrated
here that the traditional rules regarding equitable defenses and remedies
have shifted dramatically. Both the City of Sherrill Court and the Cayuga
court claimed to be evaluating these claims under "equitable considera-
tions." '286 Certainly the state defendants in these cases were looking to bene-
fit from illegal and fraudulent activity. The land in question in the New
York cases was all taken in violation of federal law, and usually under
questionable circumstances.287 According to Professor Campisi, "[i]n 1788
and 1789 [New York] took by fraud and deceit over seven million acres of
land, the largest amount from the Oneidas."2 ' For the state to benefit from
an equitable defense given its illegal and certainly inequitable dealings with
the tribes is "novel indeed." '289
However, courts using the new laches defense do not consider this as-
pect of the state's actions regarding the land claims.29 Again, simple delay,
whether justified or not, and disruption weigh more heavily than other equi-
ties. This separation of equity from equitable defenses allows the courts to
rule in favor of the non-tribal defendants regardless of their actions.
In new laches, the defendant's illegal actions do not weigh in the bal-
ancing of equities. While no court has discussed clean hands in the context
of these claims, the state comes to these cases with unclean hands.29' Tribes
continue to brief this in their memorandums of law,292 but thus far the
courts have not considered them under new laches. Even in cases where the
judge acknowledges the state's action and culpability, the court still applies
new laches regardless of the wrong.293 Oddly, in most cases an action in
violation of law, including the wrongful taking of land, does not become
285 E.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Cayuga Indian Nation v.
Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Vill. of Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d
203 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
286 City ofSherrill, 544 U.S. at 217-20; Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275.
287 Krakoff, supra note 31, at 12-13; Singer, supra note 4, at 612.
288 Jack Campisi, From Stanwix to Canandaigua: National Policy, States' Rights and Indian Land,
in IROQUOIS LAND CLAIMS 49, 58 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Stama eds., 1988). Campisi goes
on to give a specific example of the deception used by Governor Clinton and New York treaty commis-
sioners to obtain five million acres of land for "$2,000 in cash, $2,000 in clothing, $1,000 in provisions
and $600 in annual rental." Id. at 59. See also Singer, supra note 4, at 615 ("The state of New York
ignored the Nonintercourse Act when it entered negotiations with the Oneida Indian Nation to take its
remaining lands. Unprotected by the United States, the Oneida Nation was effectively compelled to
relinquish more of its lands to the state of New York in violation of federal law.").
289 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985).
290 See, e.g., Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275-77; see also Krakoff, supra note 31, at 7-8, 12.
291 See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
292 E.g., Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 17, Onondaga Nation v. State of
New York, No. 05-CV-00314 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006).
293 See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 216-17 & n.11 (2005).
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legal simply by the passage of time. 294 However, under new laches, the
courts are only concerned about the current disruption to current landown-
ers. 295 An honest evaluation of past actions by the tribes and past actions by
the state is never part of the opinion. This is fundamentally different from
traditional laches, where the past weighs heavily on the determination of the
claim.
D. Sovereign Immunity from Laches
The rest of this Part discusses the maxim of sovereign immunity from
laches. Because this is one area where new laches is not fully settled, it is
an area for tribes to focus on when faced with the defense. Sovereign im-
munity from laches is an area where the law is relatively clear in traditional
laches and unclear in new laches. The City of Sherrill Court did not con-
sider the issue and the Cayuga court discussed its application only as to the
United States. 296 Tribes should continue to argue that they are immune from
laches, even after the Cayuga opinion. Tribal sovereign immunity is still a
viable defense in federal courts, particularly if the case is tied to the tribe's
inherent sovereignty. 297 Given the similar roots between sovereign immu-
nity from suit and sovereign immunity from laches, 25 an argument drawing
this parallel for tribal sovereign immunity from suit and from laches may be
one way to counter new laches. As discussed below, sovereign immunity
from laches is discussed in the Cayuga opinion, but is tenuously based on
inapplicable court opinions. 99
294 See, e.g., Causey v. United States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1916) ("And when a suit is brought to
annul a [land] patent obtained in violation of these restrictions [on disposal of public lands], the purpose
is not merely to regain the title, but also to enforce a public statute and maintain the policy underlying it.
Such a suit is not within the reason of the ordinary rule that a vendor suing to annul a sale fraudulently
induced must offer and be ready to return the consideration received. That rule, if applied, would tend to
frustrate the policy of the public land laws; and so it is held that the wrongdoer must restore the title
unlawfully obtained and abide the judgment of Congress as to whether the consideration paid shall be
refunded.").
295 Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 274.
296 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217-20; Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 278-79.
297 Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-56 (1998). But see C & L Enters., Inc. v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001) (finding the tribe waived sovereign
immunity); TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 681 (5th Cir. 1999) (allowing a case to be
brought against a tribe for injunctive relief, but holding on other grounds the tribal court retained juris-
diction over the case).
298 United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 490 (1878) ("The exemption of the United States from
suits, except as they themselves may provide, rests upon the same foundation as the rule of nullum
tempus with respect to them.").
299 See Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 278-79.
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1. The Original Understanding of Sovereign Immunity from
Equitable Defenses
Our legal notions of sovereignty, embodied in certain legal defenses
such as sovereign immunity and immunity from laches, originate in the
western, English understanding of the king and the law. Bracton referred to
the king as vicarius Dei in terris, essentially, God's representative on
earth.3"' This understanding of the king led to certain doctrines that pro-
tected the role of the king as God's servant and protector of his subjects. 3 11
Specifically relating to laches, the concept of nullum tempus occurrit regi,
or that no time runs against the king, prevented the defense of laches from
applying to the king.3 2 Because the king was the sovereign of the country
and representative of his people, doing the people's business could not in-
terfere with timely court claims. 303 The king could do no wrong, and he was
assumed to be permanently occupied with the people's business.33" Allow-
ing the king to be subject to laches would be a direct contradiction of this
legal understanding of sovereignty. Much like sovereign immunity, which
protected the king from lawsuits, protection from laches originated ulti-
mately from the understanding that any jurisdiction over the king would
lessen his power.0 5 "[H]is supreme sovereignty makes him immediate un-
der God .... It makes all lands to be holden of him, every surrender unto
him to be good, no action to lie against him, for who shall command the
king? ' 3
06
Immunity from laches has also been linked to the understanding of so-
vereign immunity as far back as 1716, and likely before.30 7 Because all jus-
tice flowed from the king and the king was the source of all law, equitable
defenses such as laches, and later acquiescence, could not be then used
against the king. The sovereign was immune from the defense of laches. 30
This understanding carried over in Supreme Court decisions such as United
States v. Kirkpatrick,3 9 perhaps the first case discussing the issue. The
Court held that "[t]he general principle is, that laches is not imputable to the
300 Fritz Schulz, Bracton on Kingship, 60 ENG. HIST. REV. 136, 149 (1945).
301 See T.A. MORRIS, EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 10 (1998).
302 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *247 ("In farther pursuance of this principle, the
law also determines that in the king can be no negligence, or laches, and therefore no delay will bar his
right.").
303 See id.
304 Id. at *245 ("Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the king, in his politi-
cal capacity, absolute perfection. The king can do no wrong ... ").
305 Schulz, supra note 300, at 149; see also Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L.
REV. 349, 353 (1925).
306 2 SIR HENRY FINCH, LAW OR A DISCOURSE THEREOF 83 (1759).
307 Attorney Gen. v. Norstedt, (1716) 146 Eng. Rep. 203, 205 (Exch. Div.).
308 BLACKSTONE, supra note 302, at *247.
309 22 U.S. 720 (1824).
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Government; and this maxim is founded, not in the notion of extraordinary
prerogative, but upon a great public policy."310
That public policy became the public interest doctrine, a democratic
adaptation of nullum tempus. In a case decided by Judge Story for the state
of Massachusetts before he became a Supreme Court Justice, he discussed
the adoption of nullum tempus in the United States.3 ' He surveyed English
law and English commentators and ended with this conclusion:
The true reason ... there can be no negligence or laches imputed to the crown, and, there-
fore, no delay should bar its right, though sometimes asserted to be, because the king is al-
ways busied for the public good, and therefore, has not the leisure to assert his right within
the times limited to subjects .... 312
He went on to hold that this understanding of nullum tempus is "to be found
in the great public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues and
property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers.. ." and
is "introduced for the public benefit, and equally applicable to all govern-
ments."3 1 Accordingly, as the courts refined ideas of sovereign immunity
from laches, they began to characterize this public policy as a public inter-
est doctrine.314 In 1840, the Supreme Court held:
Not upon any notion of prerogative; for even in England, where the doctrine is stated under
the head of prerogative this, in effect, means nothing more than that this exception is made
from the statute, for the public good; and the king represents the nation. The real ground is a
great principle of public policy, which belongs alike to all governments, that the public inter-
est should not be prejudiced by the negligence of public officers .... 315
The public right or public interest doctrine is based on the govern-
ment's role to protect public interests or enforce public rights. 316 To avoid
laches, the sovereign must be protecting some public interest.317 Using this
doctrine to keep laches from applying to a government in a case does pro-
vide a court with some leeway, allowing laches to attach if the government
is protecting aprivate right. These cases are rare, but tend to be used in land
title cases, when the current owner is trying to quiet title, and the original
deed to the land came from the government. 318 These cases tend to be older,
310 Id. at735.
311 United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373).
312 Id.
313 id.
314 See Green, supra note 256, at 282.
315 United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. 301, 315 (1840).
316 Green, supra note 256, at 282.
317 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 121 (2008).
318 E.g., United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 343 (1888); United States v. Fletcher, 242 F. 818,
820 (8th Cir. 1917) ("While the United States is not barred by laches from maintaining a suit brought to
(VOL. 16:2
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 390 2008-2009
2009] THE NEW LACHES: CREATING TITLE WHERE NONE EXISTED 391
because outside of Indian law rarely does a quiet title action now trace its
way back to the original government land grant.
For example, in United States v. Thompson,319 the Court stated that
nullum tempus is an "incident[] . . . of sovereignty," held by each state and
the United States after independence .3 " The "exception [is] equally appli-
cable to all governments." 32 ' This same statement was upheld by the Court
in 1938 in Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York,3 22 when it added that this im-
munity is supportable "[r]egardless of the form of government and inde-
pendently of royal prerogative once thought to justify it."' 32 3 As late as 1991,
the Court stated "laches ... is generally inapplicable against a state. '324 Any
sovereign, therefore, ought to be immune from the defense of laches. The
public interest doctrine can also be broad, incorporating everything from
state medical licensing boards 32 to the collection of debts .326 Anything that
can qualify as beneficial to a sovereign's citizens can fall under the public
interest doctrine.327 If the sovereign is acting on behalf of its people when
bringing a claim, any delay in that claim ought to be excused.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that acquiescence, like laches,
cannot be applied against the federal government. 321 In a dispute with the
State of California over a three-mile belt of ocean off the coast of the state,
the Court held that "officers who have no authority at all to dispose of gov-
ernment property cannot by their conduct cause the government to lose its
valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act. ' 329 More
importantly, the officers with "no authority" worked at the Department of
the Interior, where they denied oil and gas permits because they believed
the land was owned by California. a33 The Court held otherwise and the offi-
cials' actions were not enough to overcome the federal government's own-
enforce a public right or to assert a public interest, and in which it is the real party in interest, it is so
barred from maintaining suits in which it is merely a formal party, brought to enforce the rights of
individuals and involving no interest of the government. This distinction has often been declared in suits
brought in the name of the United States to cancel grants of the public lands." (citing United States v.
Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888))).
319 98 U.S. 486 (1878).
320 Id. at 489.
321 Id. at 490 (citing United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373)).
322 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
323 Id. at 132.
324 Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 388 (1991).
325 Stein v. State Psychology Examining Bd., 668 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
326 See Oregon v. Ingram, 63 F.2d 417, 418 (9th Cir. 1933).
327 See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 141 (2008).
328 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947).
329 Id. (citing United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31, 32 (1940); Utah v.
United States, 284 U.S. 534, 545, 546 (1932); Lee Wilson & Co. v. United States, 245 U.S. 24, 32
(1917); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917)).
330 Id. at 39.
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ership.' Seven years earlier, in a dispute with the city of San Francisco,
the Court found that the "United States is neither bound nor estoppped by
acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to
do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit. 332 Again,
the actions and agreements were those of the Department of the Interior.33
2. State Sovereign Immunity from Laches
In addition to a long federal history of sovereign immunity from la-
ches, most states have a history of similar holdings.334 Much like sovereign
immunity from suit, sovereign immunity from laches applies to sovereigns,
but not lesser organized governments such as cities or municipalities.33
In a survey of state cases, only six states have expressly overturned the
doctrine of nullum tempus.336 A majority of state courts consider the state
government immune from laches.337 As early as 1840, a Supreme Court
case found that the principle had "been decided in New York, Massachu-
setts, Pennsylvania, and no doubt, in other states . *."..338 Much like the
application of sovereign immunity, some states have found that nullum
tempus only applies to the state and does not apply to municipalities,339
highway boards,340 licensing boards,34' or cities.342 In at least one case, a
331 Id. at 39-40.
332 United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 32 (1940) (quoting Utah Power
& Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917)).
333 Id. at31.
334 Mack, supra note 238, at 187.
335 Id. at 188.
336 United States v. Blackburn, 48 P. 904, 905 (Ariz. 1897); Shootman v. Dep't of Transp., 926
P.2d 1200, 1206 (Colo. 1996) (en banc); Michigan Dep't of Treasury, Revenue Div. v. Campbell, 309
N.W.2d 668, 672-73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592
A.2d 559, 561 (N.J. 1991) (with relation to statutes of limitations); Weinberg v. State Bd. of Exam'rs,
501 A.2d 239, 245 (Pa. 1985); State ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408, 412-13 (S.C.
2000). See also Sigmund D. Schutz, Time to Reconsider Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi-The Applica-
bility of Statutes of Limitations Against the State of Maine in Civil Actions, 55 ME. L. REv. 373, 375
(2003).
337 See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938) ("So complete has been its
acceptance that the implied immunity of the domestic 'sovereign,' state or national, has been universally
deemed to be an exception to local statutes of limitations .... (citing United States v. Thompson, 98
U.S. 486, 489 (1878))); Brown v. Tr. of Sch., 79 N.E. 579, 579-80 (I1. 1906); State v. Sch. Dist. No. 3,
8 P. 208, 212 (Kan. 1885); Larocca v. State Bd., 897 S.W.2d 37, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Dep't of
Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., Inc., 439 A.2d 101, 101 (Pa. 1981).
338 United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. 301, 315 (1840).
339 Royal Oak Twp. v. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 33 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Mich. 1948) (applying laches to a
municipal corporation).
340 Dalton Highway Dist. of Kootenai County v. Sowder, 401 P.2d 813, 815 (Idaho 1965) (apply-
ing equitable estoppel to a county highway district).
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 392 2008-2009
2009] THE NEW LACHES: CREATING TITLE WHERE NONE EXISTED 393
state that rejects state sovereign immunity from laches still requires a
stronger showing of laches when suing the state than would be required for
a private individual.
343
Three examples from New York, Illinois, and Oregon demonstrate the
majority view of the law in the United States regarding sovereign immunity
from laches. In New York State from 1881 to 2004, state courts consistently
found that laches did not apply to state actions, with one exception.3" In a
1995 case where the state Attorney General entered a money judgment six
years after "entry of the judgment holding respondents liable for restitution
to its defrauded customers," the New York Supreme Court Appellate Divi-
sion let the money judgment stand, holding that "[t]he doctrine of laches
does not apply to the State when it acts in a governmental, as opposed to
private or proprietary, capacity to enforce a public right or protect a public
interest." '3 4 5
In Illinois, an 1873 case, which has not been overturned, held that it
"is well settled that no laches can be imputed to the government, and by the
same reasoning which excuses it from laches, and on the same grounds, it
should not be affected by the negligence or even willfulness of any one of
its officials." '346
Finally, in 1968, the Oregon Supreme Court surveyed state and federal
cases on the issue and held that laches did not apply to the State Land
Board and asserted that this was the majority view.347 This holding has been
cited with approval in Oregon since.348
341 Shah v. State Bd. of Med., 589 A.2d 783, 800-04 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1991). But see Stein v. State
Psychology Examining Bd., 668 N.W.2d 112, 114-16 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (holding laches did not
apply to a psychology examining board).
342 Boise City v. Wilkinson, 102 P. 148, 156-57 (Idaho 1909) (Ailshie, J., concurring) (applying
laches to a city).
343 Weinberg v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Exam'r of Pub. Accountants, 501 A.2d 239, 243 (Pa.
1985).
344 See Carney v. Newburgh Park Motors, 444 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (applying
laches to the State Insurance Fund because "[w]hile the State Insurance Fund is an agency of the State,
its function is akin to that of a private insurance carrier...").
345 New York v. Astro Shuttle Arcades, Inc., 633 N.Y.S.2d 304, 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (citing
Carney, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 220-21).
346 People v. Brown, 67 Ill. 435, 438 (1873). See also State v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irriga-
tion Dist., 10 N.W.2d 631, 633-34 (Neb. 1943).
347 Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Bd., 439 P.2d 575, 578-84 (Or. 1968).
348 See, e.g., Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 986 P.2d 536, 551 (Or. 1999);
DeFazio v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 679 P.2d 1316, 1347-48 (Or. 1984).
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3. The Problem with Cayuga and Sovereign Immunity from Laches
The Supreme Court has consistently held that laches does not gener-
ally apply to a sovereign.349 The City of Sherrill Court did not directly ad-
dress this issue. However, the Court was applying laches to not one, but two
sovereigns-the United States federal government and the Oneida Indian
Nation government. 350 The Cayuga court attempted to address this issue in
its opinion, though the cases it cited were odd choices and were well ad-
dressed in the dissent."' In particular, the Cayuga court specifically held
that laches can apply to not only the sovereign Cayuga Nation, but to the
United States government as well.352 In addition to the other problematic
parts of this opinion, the application of laches to the United States is a rare
occurrence, much less in a land claim situation.
The Cayuga court mentioned two cases,3 53 United States v. Adminis-
trative Enterprises, Inc.354 and National Labor Relations Board v. P*I*E
Nationwide,35 both opinions by Judge Posner. In these cases, the Seventh
Circuit used three Supreme Court opinions to make the startling conclusion
that "laches is generally and we think correctly assumed to be applicable to
suits by government agencies as well as by private parties. '356
In P*I*E Nationwide, a case involving the National Labor Relations
Board, the court addressed whether laches would apply to the Board due to
its delay in bringing an enforcement action for an unfair labor practice or-
der.357 While the court ultimately held that laches did not apply to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, the court acknowledged the view "that laches
was not a defense to a suit by the United States," citing an 1888 Supreme
Court case.355 However, the Seventh Circuit neglected to mention more
recent cases in which the Supreme Court adopted this view, as recently as
1961."' Yet, Judge Posner seemed ready to apply laches, but for the harm
prong of the defense.3 6' Because no one was harmed by the delay in the
349 See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961); United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 735 (1824).
350 See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 213, 217 (2005).
351 See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 278-79 (2005); id. at 286-89 (Hall, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in the judgment).
352 Id. at 279.
353 Id. at 278-79.
314 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
355 894 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1990).
356 Id. at 894 (citing EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1988)); see Admin. Enters.,
Inc., 46 F.3d at 672-73 (citing P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d at 893-94; Vucitech, 842 F.2d at 942-
43).
357 P*l*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d at 893-94.
358 Id. at 894 (citing United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344 (1888)).
359 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961).
360 P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d at 894.
(VOL. 16:2
HeinOnline  -- 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 394 2008-2009
2009] THE NEW LACHES: CREATING TITLE WHERE NONE EXISTED 395
case, the court held laches would not apply against the National Labor Re-
lations Board."'
United States v. Administrative Enterprises, decided five years later,
goes further in its discussion of laches by seeking to interpret Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC,362 a case where the Supreme Court may have
opened the door for the application of laches to the United States.3 63 Oddly,
the Occidental Life case is not about laches, but about a statute of limita-
tions, or lack thereof.36" The Occidental Life Court held that importing a
state statute of limitations into the case would be "inconsistent with the
congressional intent underlying the enactment of the 1972 amendments [to
Title VII]." '365 The case began when the EEOC launched an investigation of
Occidental Life that eventually led to an EEOC enforcement action.366 The
company moved to have the action dismissed because the EEOC had ex-
ceeded a state statute of limitations.36 7
In finding against the company, the Supreme Court refused to apply
the statute of limitations, stating that in future cases, the EEOC may delay
too long in bringing an enforcement action.36 The Court held: "[i]f such
cases arise the federal courts do not lack the power to provide relief...
The same discretionary power 'to locate "a just result" in light of the cir-
cumstances peculiar to the case,' can also be exercised when the EEOC is a
plaintiff. 3 69 In the dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued for imposing a dead-
line on the EEOC, but made a distinction between the United States suing
"in its sovereign capacity" and an enforcement suit from the EEOC.370 Re-
ferring to Board of County Commissioners of Jackson County v. United
States,17' a federal Indian law case, Justice Rehnquist found this case inap-
plicable to the case at hand because "[i]t involved a suit brought by the
United States in its sovereign capacity, to which it is clear state limitations
period do not apply."3"'
The Administrative Enterprises opinion acknowledged that "[t]here is
no dearth of statements that laches cannot be used against the govern-
361 id.
362 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
363 See id; United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1995).
364 Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 360-61.
365 Id. at 369.
366 Id. at 357-58.
367 Id. at 358.
368 Id. at 376.
369 Id. at 373 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
424 (1975)).
370 Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 374-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
371 Board ofComm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
372 Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 378 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Board ofComm "rs, 308 U.S.
at 351).
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ment." '373 However, the court went on to discuss the ways the door has been
kept open on the question, specifically citing P*I*E Nationwide.374 The
court also mentioned that perhaps laches would only apply to the govern-
ment in "egregious instances," or when there is no applicable statute of
limitations, or if the government is looking to enforce a "private right." '375
All of this is dicta, however, because the court then stated, "[w]e need not
pursue the question of the existence and scope of a defense of laches in
government suits to resolve this case." '376 On other grounds, the court found
for the government.377 While these cases do not apply laches to the govern-
ment, the Seventh Circuit's dicta on when laches may or may not apply to
the government gave the Second Circuit needed ammunition for its argu-
ment that laches can now apply to the government.378 To the contrary, as
illustrated above, there is a long history of the Supreme Court, lower courts,
state courts, and commentators all agreeing that laches does not apply to a
sovereign.379 At the very least, laches does not apply when a sovereign is
enforcing a public right or protecting a public interest, nor does the laches
of its agents bind a sovereign."38
The two other cases the Cayuga court cited are Supreme Court cases,
Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc."' and
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs.382 Heckler is concerned with es-
toppel against the government, not laches.383 The Heckler Court stated that
"it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same
terms as any other litigant."3"4 The Court went on to state that it was "hesi-
tant" to hold that there "are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring
that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be out-
weighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum stan-
dard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Govern-
ment." 5 The Court did not reach this decision because it was "unnecessary
to decide" the case.386 Irwin is another EEOC case concerned with equitable
373 United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Costello v.
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961)).
374 Id. at 672-73.
375 Id. at 673.
376 id.
377 See id. at 674.
378 See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 278-79 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Admin. En-
ters., Inc., 46 F.3d at 672-73; NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 1990)).
379 See supra text accompanying notes 302-48.
380 See supra text accompanying notes 310-33.
381 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
382 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
383 Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59-66.
384 Id. at 60 (citing INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam); Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,
332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947)).
385 Idat60-61.
386 Id. at 60.
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tolling, not laches.3 17 While the Court did state that "making the rule of eq-
uitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way
that it is applicable to private suits,"38 would be appropriate, the key provi-
sion is the qualification at the beginning of that sentence: "[o]nce Congress
has made such a waiver [of sovereign immunity]." '389 In short, equitable
tolling could only apply to the government when Congress has made an
express waiver of sovereign immunity."39
The Cayuga court made the broad assertion that the Cayuga Nation
land claim did not involve a public right or public interest and that the Unit-
ed States was therefore somehow not serving in its sovereign capacity.391
Given that the role of the United States in this case was the trustee for the
tribe, and that the reason for the case in the first place was the exclusive
role the United States government had in dealing with Indian tribes, it
seems odd that bringing a land case with an Indian tribe would not be an
express exercise of its sovereignty. The Cayuga case took the three excep-
tions from dicta in Administrative Enterprises and found an "egregious"
case of laches, despite a statute of limitations that the court deemed did not
apply because the United States was not acting as a sovereign in this par-
ticular case.392 Given the clear precedent holding otherwise, sovereign im-
munity from laches may still be an open question in the other circuits and
practitioners should look at it as a possible defense to claims of new laches.
4. Possible Implications of Arguing for Sovereign Immunity from
Laches by Both Tribes and the Federal Government
While a few cases have weighed the equities of an individual versus
the government,39 3 no court has explicitly addressed when two sovereigns'
public rights and interests come into conflict. While the Supreme Court has
addressed state boundary disputes using the equitable defense of acquies-
387 Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94-96.
388 Id. at 95.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 95-96 (stating that a waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be un-
equivocally expressed" (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980))). This is the same
standard required for a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity.
391 See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 279 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing
United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 2002)).
392 Id. at 278-79.
393 E.g., United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213, 219 (1896) (stating that "the equities which arise
as between individuals have but a limited application as between the government and a citizen" because
the government is enforcing a public policy). See also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
233, 273 (1841) (explaining that laches did not bar the claim because "here two political communities
are concerned, who cannot act with the same promptness as individuals").
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cence, there has not been a weighing of public rights.394 The City of Sherrill
Court placed the public rights as represented by the city and state higher
than those represented by the tribe or the federal government. 95 While this
is not expressly stated anywhere in the opinion, it is apparent in the out-
come.
Perhaps by getting the court to determine the relative value of public
rights, a more honest evaluation of the equities of a land claim will be per-
formed. Rather than framing the argument over the prongs of laches, the
argument is between the public rights of the tribal citizens and of the state.
How would these be weighed? Might a court engage in a clean hands anal-
ysis at that point, or otherwise concern itself with the ramifications of a
laches defense against a sovereign? The courts generally gloss over exactly
what a public right is, but needless to say, if a sovereign is suing on a public
right, that sovereign is not subject to laches. Other defenses may apply, but
getting past laches is a vital first step for any tribe in the post-City of Sher-
rill environment.
While one of the aspects of different Indian land claims cases now in-
cludes proof of constant attempts to settle the claim, which counters one
prong of laches (that the plaintiff did not delay in bringing the claim), a
tribe in its sovereign capacity should not even be required to argue that as-
pect. In countering an equitable defense, particularly laches, the tribe
should use a multi-prong argument. This argument should begin with the
claim that laches does not apply to sovereigns. The tribe is a sovereign,
enforcing the public right of its citizens to its land, and laches cannot apply
to them. Indeed, the tribe should not have to prove any constant attempt to
bring the claim, because even if tribal leaders had not, the tribal citizens, as
members of a sovereign entity, should not be harmed by the actions of past
tribal leaders. In bringing the land claim, the tribe is simply protecting the
public interest of its citizens.
The main problem, however, with the defense of new laches is the
second prong-that the defendant will be disrupted as a result of the delay
of the plaintiff. This will always weigh heavily in the federal courts; it is
easy for the defendants in these cases to argue disruption if the title to the
land is returned to the tribes. On the other hand, it is difficult for a tribe to
demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the tribe did not delay in bring-
ing the claim. 396 In order to do so, it must bring in historians and cite to old
statutes and difficult case law. In addition, in new laches, a tribe must do so
in its pleadings, lest the claim be dismissed at summary judgment.
Nonetheless, any statement that demonstrates laches is more than just
the passage of time is important for tribes to have at their disposal. In re-
gards to the second prong, the state may simply argue it has taxed the land
394 See supra Part II.B.
395 See supra Parts I, III.D.3.
396 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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for two hundred years, that its citizens have lived on the land for two hun-
dred years, and to disturb the title at this point would lead to disruption.
Tribes must continue to point out the many contradictions. For example, a
polluter does not get to keep polluting just because he has done it for a long
time without the government noticing and suing. 397 A law deemed to be
unconstitutional does not get to be constitutional just because it has been on
the books for a long time. 9 Length of time does not always ensure a right.
In some states, misbehavior on the part of a physician or lawyer does not
prevent the state from taking the professional license if a great deal of time
has passed between the misbehavior and the disciplinary proceeding. 99
Laches does not become an exemption for bad behavior.
For example, in a case from 1891, bona fide purchasers of land from a
company that was supposed to build a road on the land were not "entitled to
rely upon the acts of Congress of 1867 and 1874, the act of the state of
Oregon, the certificate of the governor of that state, the withdrawal of the
lands from sale, and the issue of the patent" because of the apparent fraudu-
lent activities of the company (and perhaps the state) against the federal
government. 4 ' The Court also refused to allow the current land holders to
argue laches against the government, nor would allow laches to apply at the
pleading stage."'
Finally, applying laches against a sovereign opens the sovereign up to
adverse possession claims and other liabilities stemming from delay in
bringing cases on behalf of tribes. The Supreme Court recognized that by
allowing a private party to win on the issue of laches in a land case meant
that a private party could obtain title through adverse possession against the
United States.4 2 In addition, at least one commenter has pointed out the
possible effect of new laches on land claims preserved by the federal gov-
ernment.403
397 Even though Pennsylvania does not recognize state sovereign immunity from laches, the court
did hold that "stream polluters can acquire no prescriptive or property right to pollute as against the
Commonwealth no matter how long their conduct had been tolerated." Commonwealth v. Barnes &
Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 883-84 (Pa. 1974) (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. N.Y. & Pa.
Co., 79 A.2d 439, 444 (Pa. 1951); Pa. R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 126 A. 386 (Pa. 1924)).
398 Sears v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 98 N.E.2d 621, 632 (Mass. 1951) ("An unconstitutional
law cannot be made valid by the laches of anyone or by any lapse of time." (citing Barney & Carey Co.
v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9 (Mass. 1949); Commonwealth v. Parker, 2 Pick. 550 (Mass. 1824))).
399 See Stein v. State Psychology Examining Bd., 668 N.W.2d 112, 114-17 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
400 United States v. Dalles Military Rd. Co., 140 U.S. 599, 615-16 (1891).
401 Id. at 632.
402 Lindsey v. Miller, 31 U.S. 666, 673 (1832) ("If a contrary rule were sanctioned, it would only
be necessary for intruders upon the public lands, to maintain their possessions, until the statute of limita-
tions shall run; and then they would become invested with title against the government, and all persons
claiming under it. In this way the public domain would soon be appropriated by adventurers.").
403 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Land-Claims Time Bomb, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 19,
2007, http://works.bepress.com/matthew-fletcher/I 1/.
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CONCLUSION
Laches, an ancient defense from the courts of equity, now has new life
in the courts of Indian land claims. However, the new laches, created by the
Supreme Court to avoid regulatory disruption and expanded by lower courts
to avoid all tribal land claims, bears little resemblance to the original de-
fense. Traditional laches is defined by delay and injury; in a tribal land
claim, the definition is delay and disruption.4" Traditional laches is an equi-
table defense; in a tribal land claim, it applies to both legal and equitable
claims.4"5 Traditional laches requires an evaluation of the facts and balanc-
ing of equity; in a tribal land claim, new laches can apply as early as the
pleadings stage.4"6 Traditional laches is usually not applied if a statute of
limitations is in place; in a tribal land claim, it can (and will) apply within
the applicable statute of limitations.4"7 Traditional laches usually requires
clean hands; in a tribal land claim, it does not.40 8 The only way this defense
now makes sense is as a new defense, a new laches. New laches has not
replaced traditional laches as an available defense in all claims. So far, new
laches only applies to Indian tribes.40 9
Defending against this new defense is difficult for tribes, particularly
as courts continue to define its contours. Attacking the delay prong has so
far proven relatively useless.4"0 Either finding a hole in the defense or at-
tacking the disruption prong may prove to be one way to counter laches.
Countering the disruption prong by demonstrating the lack of regulatory
disruption the claim will cause may provide a strategy for tribes before end-
ing up in federal court. However, one hole in the defense, that traditional
laches does not usually apply to a sovereign, is explored extensively in this
article.4 ' Tribal sovereign immunity from new laches is still an open ques-
tion, and one for tribes to explore.
A vast majority of states and the federal government recognize that la-
ches does not, in fact, apply to a state or federal government claim. The
courts have long held that tribes are not subject to claims without their con-
sent.4"2 The defense of laches should not run against tribes as sovereigns,
and the link between laches and sovereign immunity should be perhaps
made clear. Unfortunately, the litigation on laches is moving faster than the
404 See supra Parts 11, III.C.I.
405 See supra Parts 11, III.C.2.
406 See supra Parts 11, III.C.3.
407 See supra Parts 11, III.C.4.
408 See supra Parts 11, III.C.5.
409 See supra Parts 1I1.B-D.
410 Seesupra Part III.C.I.
411 See supra Part 1II D.
412 Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977) ("Absent an effective waiver
or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.").
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research. This seems to be because courts, at least in the Second Circuit,
may feel that they have a magic bullet in applying new laches because it
will automatically eliminate all land claims. Whether sovereign immunity
from new laches is possible is debatable. However, as federal courts con-
tinue to change the rules as tribes bring their land claims, reinforcing that
these claims are an exercise of tribal sovereignty demonstrates the tribes'
continued willingness to fight long and hard battles on an uneven and ever
changing playing field.
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